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Exchange rates are a key issue in international economics and politics.
1
 While the 
determinants of exchange rates have been extensively studied in previous works, this 
dissertation contributes to the literature by deriving exchange rate expectations from stock 
market (ADR) data and analyzing their determinants. This exercise is done for three cases 
where one has to resort to exchange rate expectations since the national exchange rate is either 
manipulated by the central bank (the first paper in Chapter II), fixed in pegged exchange rate 
regimes (the second paper in Chapter III), or not existent as the considered country is part of a 
currency union and therefore has no national currency (the third paper in Chapter IV).
2
  
The first paper presented in Chapter II analyzes exchange rate expectations for the 
case of China in the period 1998-2009 in order to test standard exchange rate theories.
3
 
American officials repeatedly accused China of systematically undervaluing its currency 
against the U.S. dollar
4
, which produces political tensions between both countries. A recent 
climax in this dispute was reached on September 28, 2010, when the House of 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this dissertation the term exchange rate is used to describe the nominal exchange rate, which is 
defined as the amount of national currency units one must pay for one U.S. dollar. 
2
 The papers included in this dissertation have been modified compared to the published versions. The 
numbering of pages, tables, figures, formulas, and appendices has been modified in order to improve the 
readability of the dissertation. The text has also been slightly modified in some passages. 
3
 This paper is based on Eichler (2011a). 
4
 For example, in its semiannual report to the Congress, the U.S. Department of the Treasury called the yuan 
“substantially undervalued” (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011, p. 16). In his Congressional Testimony 
Fred Bergsten, director of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, called for a 25% appreciation of the 
yuan against the U.S. dollar (Bergsten, 2010).  
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Representatives passed the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, which would allow the 
imposition of import duties for countries with undervalued currencies, namely China. 
Although this bill did not pass the Senate, Chinese officials clearly opposed the bill arguing 
against significant undervaluation of the yuan and in favor of political opportunism of U.S. 
officials.
5
 As the assessments of a fair exchange rate significantly differ among officials of 
both countries, the Chinese-American exchange rate dispute continues. Measuring the 
development of market determined exchange rate expectations may help to find a compromise 
in this international political dispute and knowing the determinants of these expectations may 
help to identify macroeconomic policies necessary to influence future exchange rates.  
The second paper presented in Chapter III investigates the development of exchange 
rate expectations and their determinants for the currency crisis episodes in Argentina (2001-
2002), Malaysia (1998-1999), and Venezuela (1994-1996 and 2003-2007).
6
 Large 
devaluations of Southeast Asian and Latin American currencies were to be observed during 
the currency crises in the 1990’s and at the beginning of the last decade. Due to an 
appreciation of foreign currency denominated debt, capital withdrawals, and bank runs, for 
example, currency crises typically lead to significant output losses in the affected economies 
(Hutchison and Noy, 2002). Avoiding currency crisis outbreaks has therefore become one of 
the major policy goals in many developing countries, which may explain the rapid 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves aimed to fend off speculative attacks in these 
countries. The costs of this currency crisis prevention policy are however often overseen. 
Since foreign exchange reserves are typically invested in U.S. Treasuries, they yield a 
                                                 
5
 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Jiang Yu, for example, argued that U.S. policymakers would use the 
“exchange rate issue as an excuse to engage in trade protectionism against China” (Buckley, 2010). Moreover, 
depending on the methodology used, some exchange rate models suggest that the yuan may also have become 
overvalued against the U.S. dollar recently (Cheung et al., 2010).  
6
 This paper is based on Eichler et al. (2009). This paper was co-authored by Professor Alexander Karmann and 
Professor Dominik Maltritz. Professor Alexander Karmann wrote the introductory chapter (Chapter III.1), which 
provides the motivation and relates the paper to existing works in the literature. Professor Dominik Maltritz 
wrote the conclusion section (Chapter III.6), which provides policy conclusions and an outlook for future 
research. Throughout the writing of this paper I benefited from valuable discussions with Professor Alexander 
Karmann and Professor Dominik Maltritz. 
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relatively low return compared to the high cost of domestic capital in these countries. 
Moreover, foreign exchange reserves may lose in value as the domestic currency appreciates 
against the U.S. dollar (Rodrik, 2006). An alternative way to avoid the outbreak of currency 
crises may be to regularly adjust the official exchange rate (typically managed by the 
domestic central bank) to levels in line with market expectations. Knowing market-based 
exchange rate expectations and their determinants may therefore be a cheaper way to avoid 
currency crises than holding excess amounts of foreign exchange reserves. 
The third paper presented in Chapter IV uses daily ADR data to analyze the 
determinants of the risk of withdrawals from the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for 
the five vulnerable member countries Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain for the period 
2007-2009.
 7
 The subprime lending crisis has triggered significant financial turmoil in the 
EMU. Banking systems were destabilized and the governments of Greece, Ireland, and 
Portugal had to be bailed out. Reasserting national authority over monetary policy may help 
domestic policymakers to address the problems caused by banking and sovereign debt crises 
or an overvalued euro at national discretion. While the abandonment of fixed exchange rate 
regimes has so far been analyzed for countries with national currencies, the financial 
vulnerabilities in the EMU offer a new case to study the possibility of withdrawals from a 
monetary union. Although a country’s membership in the EMU is typically considered 
irreversible, many authors agree that sovereign states can choose to leave the EMU (Cohen, 
1993; Scott, 1998; Buiter, 1999; Eichengreen, 2007). The new Treaty of Lisbon now includes 
a provision outlining voluntary withdrawal from the Union, which may cause the members to 
re-think the pros and cons of remaining in the EMU.
8
 Although the European Central Bank 
(ECB) has implemented measures meant to support the banking sectors and governments in 
the EMU, autonomous national central banks would probably pursue more expansionary 
                                                 
7
 This paper is based on Eichler (2011b). 
8





 By analyzing the determinants of exchange rate expectations in the 
monetary union one may therefore analyze the drivers of the risk of withdrawal from the 
EMU. 
 
I.2 Deriving exchange rate expectations from prices of American Depositary Receipts 
Measuring movements in exchange rate expectations is a relatively easy task for currencies in 
which a liquid and free forward exchange market exists. For the cases considered in this 
dissertation, however, the forward exchange market either produces bad forecasts or does not 
even exist. For the case of China, the yuan/U.S. dollar forward exchange rate is most likely 
managed by the Chinese central bank in the course of its foreign exchange market 
intervention policies, which hampers its ability to provide good signals for the future spot 
market exchange rate (see, for example, Wang, 2010).
10
 For the considered member countries 
of the EMU, no national currencies exist and consequently forward exchange rates cannot be 
used. For the case of the currency crisis episodes studied in this dissertation, one could use 
regression-based forecasting models that employ data on macroeconomic variables in order to 
produce currency crisis signals (see, among others, Eichengreen et al., 1995; Frankel and 
Rose, 1996; Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Karmann et al., 2002). The 
drawback of these approaches is the nature of macroeconomic data used, which enables one to 
create only monthly or quarterly crisis signals based on backward-looking data.
11
 
                                                 
9
 The ECB has, for example, implemented the “Enhanced Credit Support” program and the “Securities Markets 
Programme” meant to support the banking systems and vulnerable governments within the EMU. Sinn and 
Wollmershäuser (2011) point to a yet overlooked support measure within the eurosystem. They show that the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (in particular) grants TARGET II credits particularly to the national central banks of the 
vulnerable EMU member states Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. These TARGET II credits are generated in 
order to finance the current account deficits of the vulnerable countries and may diminish in value in the case of 
a sovereign default of one of the debtor countries.    
10
 Moreover, a comparison in forecast accuracy outlined in Section II.4 in Chapter II reveals that yuan/U.S. 
dollar forward exchange rates provide less accurate signals for future spot exchange rate changes than the stock 
market measure used in this dissertation.  
11
 As market data obviously exhibit some advantages over macroeconomic data, such as high frequency and a 
forward-looking nature, a literature emerged that uses market-based approaches to forecast banking and 
sovereign debt crises. While some papers forecast the occurrence of banking crises using macroeconomic data 
(see, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998), recent papers use market information to predict banking 
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In this dissertation I use stock market data to derive exchange rate expectations, which 
has several advantages compared to existing approaches. First of all, the prices of the 
considered stocks are most probably not manipulated by central bank interventions since these 
stocks are traded in the United States, which enables the derivation of exchange rate 
expectations formed under free market conditions (also for China). The used stock market 
data is available for the considered EMU member countries, which facilitates the analysis of 
the risk of withdrawals from the EMU. Moreover, stock market data is forward-looking and 
available on a daily basis, which enables the derivation of more accurate and up-to-date 
currency crisis signals for the considered crisis episodes. 
In order to derive exchange rate expectations I use data on a particular type of stock 
called American Depositary Receipt (ADR). An ADR is a financial instrument for foreign 
companies to list their shares at stock exchanges in the Unites States. An ADR represents the 
ownership of a specific number of underlying shares of a company in the home market on 
which the ADR is written. While the underlying stock is denominated in the currency and 
traded at the stock exchange of the home market, the ADR is denominated in U.S. dollars and 
traded at a U.S. stock exchange. Since both types of stocks of the same company generate 
identical cash flows and incorporate equivalent rights and dividend claims, cross-border 
arbitrage implies that the ADR and its underlying stock have the same price when adjusted for 
the current exchange rate. When capital controls or ownership restrictions are implemented, 
cross-border arbitrage is not possible and the law of one price is not binding. In such an 
environment, information efficiency suggests that the relative prices of ADRs and their 
underlying stocks – which only differ with respect to the currency they are denominated in – 
                                                                                                                                                        
distress (see, e.g., Gropp et al., 2006; Moshirian and Wu, 2009; Eichler et al., 2011). To forecast sovereign debt 
crises, some papers use economic fundamentals (see, e.g., Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 2004) while others 
apply market data to estimate country default risk (see, e.g., Claessens and Pennacchi, 1996; Karmann, 2000; 
Karmann and Maltritz, 2004, 2010; Huschens et al. 2007). 
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will signal exchange rate expectations of stock market investors.
12
 Using data on relative 
prices (or returns) of ADRs and their underlying stocks and the current exchange rate I can 
calculate measures for exchange rate expectations of stock market investors.   
Although the papers presented in this dissertation differ with respect to the considered 
companies, countries, and time periods, each paper uses the same kind of data and a similar 
methodology to derive exchange rate expectations – relative prices or returns of ADRs13 and 
their corresponding underlying stocks. In each paper I use a panel regression framework in 
order to analyze the determinants of exchange rate expectations. Each of the included papers 
focuses on a distinct facet of exchange rate expectations. The first paper focuses on standard 
exchange rate theories such as the relative purchasing power parity or the uncovered interest 
rate parity in order to analyze the factors that drive exchange rate expectations in general. The 
second paper studies the determinants of currency crisis expectations. The third paper 
analyzes the determinants of the risk of withdrawals from the EMU as expected by ADR 
market investors.  
 
I.3 Contribution to the literature 
This dissertation adds to two strands of the literature. First, it contributes to a literature that 
studies the determinants of exchange rates, currency crisis outbreaks, and risk of withdrawal 
from the EMU. The first paper (Chapter II) contributes to a vast literature on the determinants 
of exchange rates. An incomplete list of exchange rate determinants analyzed in the literature 
includes: labor productivity (Chinn, 2000; Cheung et al., 2007); inflation rates (Lothian and 
Taylor, 1996; Taylor et al., 2001); interest rates (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Chinn, 2006); 
                                                 
12
 For the case of the considered EMU member countries in Chapter IV, no capital controls or ownership 
restrictions are in place and thus relative stock prices cannot be used. Instead, I use ADR returns to study 
changes in exchange rate expectations.  
13
 In the first paper presented in Chapter II I additionally use data on another type of cross-listed stock called H-
share. An H-share represents the ownership of one original stock of a Chinese company (called A-share). The A-
share is denominated in yuan and traded at a Chinese stock exchange. The H-share is traded in Hong Kong and 
denominated in Hong Kong dollars. Similar to ADRs the price relation between H-shares and A-shares can 
signal expectations of the future yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate.  
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overvaluation of the domestic currency (Glick and Rose, 1999; Corsetti et al., 2000); or export 
growth (Williamson, 1994; Isard, 2007). I study the impact of these macroeconomic 
fundamentals on ADR investors’ exchange rate expectations for China. China makes a good 
case to study standard exchange rate theories since the Chinese central bank manages the 
official yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate, which therefore reacts much less to changes in 
macroeconomic fundamentals than is suggested by theory. Using ADR market data, I can test 
exchange rate theories for the Chinese peg/managed float regime under free market 
conditions. The second paper (Chapter III) contributes to a literature, which analyzes the 
determinants of currency crisis outbreaks (Eichengreen et al., 1995; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999; Karmann et al., 2002). Existing papers employ low-frequent and backward-looking 
macroeconomic data to forecast currency crises. This dissertation uses ADR market data to 
derive more accurate and up-to-date currency crisis signals on a daily basis. Moreover, the 
determinants of currency crisis expectations, such as banking or sovereign debt crisis risk, can 
be studied using daily market-based risk proxies. The third paper (Chapter IV) contributes to a 
literature on the sustainability of the EMU. Several papers discuss the possibility of 
withdrawal from the EMU (Cohen, 1993; Scott, 1998; Buiter, 1999; Eichengreen, 2007). I 
present empirical evidence that daily ADR market data reflects the risk that vulnerable 
member countries may leave the EMU and analyzes which determinants drive this withdrawal 
risk perceived by ADR investors.  
Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature on the pricing of ADRs. A 
common finding in the literature is that the outbreak of a currency crisis negatively affects the 
returns of U.S. dollar-denominated ADRs as the devaluation of the local currency depresses 
the dollar value of the underlying stock (see, for example, Bailey et al., 2000; Kim et al., 
2000; Bin et al., 2004). Several papers find that the introduction of capital controls (typically 
meant to prevent a currency crisis outbreak) can lead to a permanent violation of the law of 
one price between ADRs and their underlying stocks since cross-border arbitrage cannot take 
I.8 
 
place (Melvin, 2003; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004, 2009; Auguste et al., 2006). Arquette et al. 
(2008) and Burdekin and Redfern (2009) find that the price spreads of Chinese cross-listed 
stocks are significantly driven by market-traded forward exchange rates. This dissertation 
builds on these findings and uses the relative prices (or returns) of ADRs and their underlying 
stocks to derive exchange rate expectations. I present empirical evidence that ADR investors’ 
exchange rate expectations are driven by theory-based determinants of exchange rates, 
currency crisis outbreaks, or the risk of withdrawal from the EMU. This analysis therefore 
provides new insights into the price (return) determinants of ADRs. 
 
I.4 Main findings and policy implications 
The findings of this dissertation may broaden the understanding of exchanger rate 
expectations. The results of the first paper (Chapter II) suggest that stock market investors 
form their exchange rate expectations in accordance with standard exchange rate theories. 
Based on a monthly panel data set comprised of 22 ADR/underlying stock pairs and 52 H-
share/underlying stock pairs from December 1998 to February 2009 I find that stock market 
investors expect more yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar: if the yuan’s overvaluation 
decreases (the incentive of competitive devaluation); if the inflation differential vis-à-vis the 
United States falls (relative purchasing power parity); if the productivity growth in China 
accelerates relative to the United States (the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect); if the Chinese 
interest rate differential vis-à-vis the United States decreases (uncovered interest rate parity); 
when Chinese domestic credit relative to GDP decreases (lower risk of a twin banking and 
currency crisis); or, if Chinese sovereign bond yields fall (lower risk of a twin sovereign debt 
and currency crisis), ceteris paribus. These findings suggest that the theoretical links between 
macroeconomic variables and exchange rates in most cases also apply to exchange rate 
expectations. In this way, the results support the validity of many exchange rate theories and 
substantiate the rationality of stock market investors’ expectations. This approach (based on 
I.9 
 
stock prices formed under free market conditions) provides an opportunity to test exchange 
rate theories in managed floating regimes, where the official exchange rate is manipulated by 
the central bank and does therefore not necessarily respond to changes in macroeconomic 
fundamentals. Moreover, I use a rolling regressions forecasting framework in order to 
evaluate the quality of exchange rate expectations. I find that exchange rate expectations 
drawn from the ADR and H-share market have a better ability to predict changes in the 
yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate than the random walk or forward exchange rates, at least at 
forecast horizons longer than one year. The People’s Bank of China may take advantage of 
ADR and H-share based exchange rate expectations in order to determine possible 
misalignments of the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate. In this way, the Chinese central bank 
may improve the timing and intensity of foreign exchange market interventions meant to 
manipulate the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate.  
The second paper (Chapter III) focuses on the derivation and determination of 
currency crisis signals formed by ADR market investors. Using daily data on 17 
ADR/underlying stock pairs for the capital control episodes in Argentina (2001-2002), 
Malaysia (1998-1999), and Venezuela (1994-1996 and 2003-2007) we find that ADR 
investors anticipate currency crises or realignments well before they actually occur. 
Policymakers could use ADR investors’ up-to-date assessment of the peg’s sustainability in 
order to identify currency crisis risk earlier and to take the necessary steps to realign an 
(unsustainable) peg rate before a crisis breaks out. In this way, they could prevent the 
outbreaks of damaging currency crises without holding excess amounts of costly foreign 
exchange reserves. Using panel regressions we find that ADR investors anticipate a higher 
currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, the currencies of trading partners 
depreciate, sovereign bonds yield spreads rise, and interest rate spreads increase. These 
findings suggest that ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations are based on currency crisis 
theories even on a daily basis underlining the validity of these theories.  
I.10 
 
The third paper (Chapter IV) studies a particular form of currency crisis risk: the risk 
that vulnerable member countries could leave the EMU. I use a multifactor pricing model to 
test whether the financial vulnerability measures assumed to reflect the incentives of national 
governments to withdraw from the EMU (banking crisis risk, sovereign debt crisis risk, and 
overvaluation of the euro) are priced in ADR returns. Using daily data on 22 ADR/underlying 
stock pairs of Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain in the period January 2007 to March 
2009 I find that ADR investors perceive a higher risk of withdrawal (priced in ADR returns) 
when the risk of banking and sovereign debt crisis and the overvaluation of the euro increase. 
Policymakers could use ADR market data in order to assess the stability of the EMU. Higher 
correlations between ADR returns and currency crisis risk factors would suggest a higher risk 
of withdrawals from the EMU. In such a case, financial vulnerabilities may be addressed 
within the EMU in order to preserve the integrity of the eurozone. However, time will show 
how long the policymakers in the EMU will continue with the implementation of even more 
anti-crisis measures. Growing controversies on the ECB’s sovereign bond purchases and the 
bailouts for Greece, Ireland and Portugal cast doubt on the sustainability of the EMU in its 
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I show that the relative prices of Chinese cross-listed stocks (American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs) and H-shares) and their underlying A-shares can be used as an indicator of yuan/U.S. 
dollar exchange rate expectations. The forecasting models reveal that ADR and H-share 
discounts predict exchange rate changes more accurately than the random walk and forward 
exchange rates, particularly at forecast horizons longer than one year. Using panel 
estimations, I find that ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate expectations 
according to standard exchange rate theories such as the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect, 
the risk of competitive devaluations, relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate 
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 This paper is based on: Eichler, S., 2011. Exchange rate expectations and the pricing of Chinese cross-listed 




For two decades, Chinese companies have been allowed to issue regular domestic shares 
(called A-shares) at domestic stock exchanges and to list their shares at international stock 
exchanges in the form of H-shares in Hong Kong or American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) in 
the United States.
15
 As A-shares and cross-listed stocks of the same Chinese company 
generate  identical streams of cash flows and incorporate equivalent rights and dividend 
claims, both types of stocks should exhibit the same price in exchange rate-adjusted terms. In 
perfect capital markets, deviations from this “law of one price” should be arbitraged away. 
However, numerous papers find that the simple fact that both types of stocks are traded at 
different stock exchanges can lead to market segmentation. Several of these papers show that 
cross-listed stocks are more correlated with the stock market on which they are traded than the 




Capital controls or ownership restrictions can lead to a permanent violation of the law 
of one price between domestic and cross-listed stocks since cross-border arbitrage can not 
take place (Melvin, 2003; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004, 2009; Auguste et al., 2006). Chinese 
ownership restrictions, for example, prevent domestic investors from buying cross-listed 
stocks and international investors from buying domestic stocks. Arquette et al. (2008) observe 
ADR and H-share discounts of up to 95% relative to domestic A-shares in the period 1998 to 
2006. Given the large and persistent deviations from the law of one price, a literature has 
emerged that examines the determinants of price discounts on Chinese cross-listed stocks. 
ADR or H-share discounts relative to A-shares are found to be driven by: investor sentiments 
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 At the microeconomic level, companies may benefit from cross-listing abroad by increasing the valuation of 
their stocks relative to domestic rival firms (Melvin and Valero, 2009), by reducing the share of voting rights 
held by controlling shareholders (Ayyagari and Doidge, 2010), by becoming more immune to the effects of 
currency crises (Chandar et al., 2009), or by improving investor protection and corporate disclosure 
(Roosenboom and Dijk, 2009). At the macroeconomic level, cross-listing may lead to a more integrated 
domestic capital market with positive effects, such as lower equity costs, even for non-cross-listed companies 
(Fernandes, 2009). 
16
 For price discovery, however, trading in local stocks is frequently found to be more informative than trading in 
cross-listed stocks (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Agarwal et al., 2007; Frijns et al., 2010).  
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(Wang and Jiang, 2004; Grossman et al., 2007; Arquette et al., 2008; Burdekin and Redfern, 
2009); trading liquidity (Wang and Jiang, 2004; Chan et al., 2008); and systematic risk 
premiums  (Li et al., 2006; Burdekin and Redfern, 2009).
17
  
 Arquette et al. (2008) and Burdekin and Redfern (2009) find that a significant part of ADR 
and H-share discounts can be explained by changes in the non-deliverable yuan/U.S. dollar 
forward exchange rate. Their finding suggests that ADR and H-share investors take the risk of 
future exchange rate changes into account when pricing cross-listed stocks. This finding 
relates to papers that examine how exchange rates affect ADR returns. Since ADRs are 
denominated in U.S. dollars and their underlying stocks in the domestic currency, these 
papers find that a depreciation of the domestic currency against the U.S. dollar leads to falling 
ADR returns (Kim et al., 2000; Bailey et al., 2000; Bin et al., 2004; Grammig et al., 2005).  
 I contribute to the literature in two ways. Firstly, I show that the relative prices of cross-
listed ADRs or H-shares and their underlying A-shares can be used as an indicator for 
exchange rate expectations. Since China has imposed capital controls and transnational 
ownership restrictions, cross-border arbitrage cannot take place and the law of one price 
between A-shares and cross-listed stocks is thus not binding. I argue that ADR and H-share 
investors will align the relative prices of yuan-denominated A-shares and U.S. dollar-
denominated ADRs or Hong Kong dollar-denominated H-shares
18
 with their expectation 
about the future yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate rather than with the current official exchange 
rate. Using a rolling regressions forecasting framework I find that ADR and H-share discounts 
                                                 
17
 Chinese companies can also issue U.S. dollar-denominated B-shares in Shanghai or Hong Kong dollar-
denominated B-shares in Shenzhen. I do not include B-shares in my analysis because the ownership restrictions 
on B-shares were alleviated in February 2001 (Wang and Jiang, 2004; Arquette et al., 2008). As this regime 
change would complicate the analysis for B-share discounts, I focus on ADR and H-share discounts. B-share 
discounts relative to A-shares are found to be driven by: the risk aversion of Chinese investors (Ma, 1996); the 
liquidity of B-shares relative to A-shares (Chen et al., 2001); information asymmetries (Chakravarty et al., 1998; 
Chui and Kwok, 1998); and, the availability of other types of cross-listed stocks (Sun and Tong, 2000). 
18
 The Hong Kong dollar/U.S. dollar exchange rate shows only minimal fluctuations as Hong Kong has 
implemented a currency board with the U.S. dollar as the anchor currency since 1983. H-share discounts may 
therefore signal yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate expectations.  
 II.4 
have a better ability to predict changes in the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate than the random 
walk or forward exchange rates, at least at forecast horizons longer than one year. 
Secondly, I investigate the determinants of ADR and H-share investors’ exchange rate 
expectations. China makes a good case to study the validity of exchange rate theories since 
the yuan was pegged to the U.S. dollar from 1994 to July 20, 2005 and heavily managed 
afterwards. This implies that the official exchange rate does not react (in the peg regime), or 
reacts much less (in the managed floating regime), to changes in macroeconomic 
fundamentals than suggested by theory. I study the validity of exchange rate theories by 
testing the impact of macroeconomic fundamentals on the exchange rate expectations ADR 
and H-share investors form under free market conditions. Using panel data on 22 ADR/A-
share stock pairs and 52 H-share/A-share stock pairs from December 1998 to February 2009 I 
find that ADR and H-share investors expect more yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar: if 
the yuan’s overvaluation decreases (the incentive of competitive devaluation); if the inflation 
differential vis-à-vis the United States falls (relative purchasing power parity); if the 
productivity growth in China accelerates relative to the United States (the Harrod-Balassa-
Samuelson effect); if the Chinese interest rate differential vis-à-vis the United States 
decreases (uncovered interest rate parity); when Chinese domestic credit relative to GDP 
decreases (lower risk of a twin banking and currency crisis); or, if Chinese sovereign bond 
yields fall (lower risk of a twin debt and currency crisis), ceteris paribus. The results suggest 
that ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate expectations in accordance with 
standard exchange rate theories. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II.2 rationalizes the 
argument that the relative prices of cross-listed stocks and their underlying stocks contain 
information about exchange rate expectations. Section II.3 discusses the development of the 
ADR and H-share discounts in the period 1998-2009. Section II.4 presents a forecasting 
framework testing the ability of ADR and H-share discounts to signal exchange rate changes. 
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Section II.5 analyzes the determinants of ADR and H-share investors’ exchange rate 
expectations. Section II.6 concludes.      
 
II.2 Exchange rate expectations and the Chinese ADR and H-share discounts 
II.2.1 The ADR discount 
An ADR represents ownership of a specific number of underlying shares in the home market 
– in this case, China – on which the ADR is written.19 While the ADR is traded at a U.S. stock 
exchange and is denominated in U.S. dollars, the underlying Chinese A-share is denominated 
in yuan and traded at a Chinese stock exchange (Shanghai or Shenzhen). The starting point of 
the discussion is ADR conversion. ADR conversion means that one ADR, traded in the 
United States and quoted in U.S. dollars at price ADRitp , can be converted into i  A-shares, 
traded in China and quoted in yuan at price CNitp . The variable i  is called the conversion 
ratio and is specific to each Chinese company, i . ADR conversion implies that the ADR and 
its underlying A-share are perfect substitutes. As both types of stocks of the same company 
generate identical streams of cash flows and incorporate equivalent rights and dividend 
claims, ADRs and their underlying A-shares should exhibit the same price after applying the 
current official exchange rate, tS , defined as the amount of yuan per U.S. dollar. In a perfect 
capital market (with no ownership restrictions or capital controls), arbitrage forces ensure the 










 .                             (II.1) 
China is not a perfect capital market in this sense. Ownership restrictions and capital controls 
in China prohibit foreign investors from buying A-shares and domestic investors from buying 
cross-listed ADRs making cross-border arbitrage between domestic A-shares and cross-listed 
                                                 
19
 See Karolyi (1998) for an excellent survey on the ADR market. 
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ADRs impossible. The absence of arbitrage forces allows for a permanent violation of the law 
of one price, i.e. that price discrepancies between A-shares and ADRs can occur and persist 
over time suggesting that Eq. (II.1) is not binding. That is, the relative share prices do not 
necessarily reflect the current official exchange rate (which is managed by the Chinese central 
bank) but can indicate ADR investors’ expected exchange rate. If ADR investors anticipate 
that the expected future exchange rate, expitS  , deviates from the current official exchange rate, 
tS , the price relation between ADRs and A-shares should incorporate this expectation as 











 .                                  (II.2) 
If ADR investors expect the yuan to depreciate against the U.S. dollar, the relative prices of 
the ADR and the underlying A-share will reflect an expected exchange rate that is higher than 
the current official exchange rate, i.e. t
exp
it SS  . In this case, the ADR seems to be 
undervalued since its price (Eq., II.2) is lower than the right-hand side of Eq. (II.1) indicates. 
Expectations of a depreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar thus lead to an ADR 
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it Spp  , trades at a premium to the ADR price implied by the current 




it Spp  .  
 In the literature the ADR discount is typically used to measure price discrepancies 





















 ,                 (II.3) 
where ADRitp  is the actual market-traded ADR price (that contains the expected exchange rate, 
exp
itS ) and ti
CN
it Sp   is the hypothetical ADR price implied by the current official exchange 
rate, tS . Assuming that the relative price of the ADR and its underlying A-share reflects the 
expected exchange rate as shown in Eq. (II.2), it is straightforward to show that the ADR 








discount  ADR .                              (II.4) 
Assuming information efficiency, the ADR discount is an indicator of exchange rate 
expectations ADR investors form on the basis of publicly available information. As soon as 
the market receives new information about the yuan’s fair future value against the U.S. dollar, 
the ADR discount will adjust. If ADR investors expect a relatively weaker yuan (i.e. more 
yuan depreciation or less yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar), they will attach lower 
prices to ADRs and the ADR discount will fall, ceteris paribus. If ADR investors expect a 
relatively stronger yuan (i.e. less yuan depreciation or more yuan appreciation against the U.S. 
dollar), they will attach higher prices to ADRs and the ADR discount will increase, ceteris 
paribus.
20
     
                                                 
20
 The considerations so far build on the assumption of perfect capital markets. In reality, however, some aspects 
of the ADR market, such as transaction costs, bid-ask spreads or infrequent trading, contradict this assumption. 
These frictions can lead to company- or market-specific no-arbitrage bands within which arbitrage strategies, 
aimed at exploiting price spreads between ADRs and their underlying stocks, do not pay off. These market 
frictions should have only a minor impact on the results. First, this analysis relies on exploiting the variation in 
the ADR discount over time. As market frictions should not change much over time, they should be captured by 
the constant in the regressions. Second, Levy Yeyati et al. (2009) find for a large set of emerging economies that 
no-arbitrage bands are generally narrow and that price spreads outside these bands are arbitraged away very 
quickly. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that market frictions play only a minor role in determining the 
 II.8 
II.2.2 The H-share discount 
An H-share is another type of cross-listed stock. It represents the ownership of one Chinese 
A-share of company i .
21
 The H-share is traded in Hong Kong and denominated in Hong 
Kong dollars. Translating the H-share price into U.S. dollars using the (nearly constant) Hong 
Kong dollar/U.S. dollar exchange rate, I denote the H-share price as HKitp  (measured in U.S. 
dollars).
22
 Analogous to the case of ADRs, the price relation between H-shares and A-shares 
can signal expectations of the future yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate since cross-border 
arbitrage between H-shares and A-shares cannot take place due to ownership restrictions and 
capital controls in China.  
 The literature typically uses the H-share discount to measure price discrepancies between 
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 ,                     (II.5) 
where the H-share price contains the future yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate expected by H-




it Spp  . Similar to the case of ADRs, the H-share discount can 








discount share-H .                             (II.6) 
                                                                                                                                                        
ADR discount during capital controls as well. Accordingly, the majority of the variation in the ADR discount 
can be attributed to changes in exchange rate expectations. 
21
 Contrary to the case of ADRs, the conversion ratio of H-shares is one by definition. 
22
 Hong Kong has implemented a currency board system with the U.S. dollar as the anchor currency since 1983. 
The Hong Kong dollar/U.S. dollar exchange rate therefore shows only minimal fluctuations. 
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Lower H-share discounts indicate that H-share investors anticipate a relatively less valuable 
yuan, i.e. more yuan depreciation or less yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar, ceteris 
paribus. Higher H-share discounts indicate expectations of a relatively more valuable yuan, 
i.e. less yuan depreciation or more yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar, ceteris paribus. 
 
II.3 ADR and H-share discounts in China 1998-2009 
The empirical analysis uses data on 22 ADR/A-share pairs and 52 H-share/A-share pairs from 
December 1998 to February 2009. The included companies are listed in Table II.A1 in 
Appendix II. Using data on prices of A-shares and ADRs or H-shares, conversion ratios, and 
the official yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate, I calculate the ADR discount for each ADR/A-
share pair according to Eq. (II.3) and the H-share discount for each H-share/A-share pair 
according to Eq. (II.5) over time. All data is taken from Datastream. Each stock pair has an 
individual ADR or H-share discount suggesting that investors’ assessments of the future 
yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate (can) vary by company, for example due to investor 
sentiments or liquidity conditions
23




 At the beginning of the sample period (December 1998), the average ADR and H-share 
discounts were near their lowest points, at around -79% and -86%.
25
 These low discounts may 
indicate that investors expected the yuan to devaluate along with most of the Southeast Asian 
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 In the empirical analyses in Sections II.4 and II.5 I use company-specific discounts. In the regression analysis 
in Section II.5, I control for company-specific determinants of the ADR and H-share discounts by including 
control variables, for example, company-specific investor sentiments or liquidity conditions. 
24
 This descriptive explanation of the development of ADR and H-share discounts does not consider the exact 
value of ADR and H-share discounts but rather focuses on the development of the discounts in time. That is 
because the exact value of the discounts is, for example, driven by company-specific determinants (such as 
investor sentiments, liquidity, or market capitalization), which are not in the scope of the dissertation. I focus on 
the time variation of ADR and H-share discounts, which is presumably driven by changes in exchange rate 
expectations of stock market investors (see Chapter II.2). 
25
 In the period December 1998 to mid 2006 the averaged ADR discounts are systematically higher than the 
averaged H-share discounts. This observation may be explained by the fact that the averaged ADR discount is 
based on much less individual stocks than the averaged H-share discount, which is due to the better availability 
of data on H-shares (see Table II.A1 in the Appendix). Since the discounts of individual ADRs or H-shares may 
systematically differ due to company-specific factors (such as investor sentiments, liquidity, or market 
capitalization), the averaged values of ADRs and H-share discounts may also be different.     
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currencies, which had sharply depreciated against the U.S. dollar during the Asian financial 
crisis. After the Asian crisis was over and China’s “economic miracle”, characterized by fast 
export and productivity growth and low inflation, started, the discounts increased between 
2000 and 2005, which reflected investors’ expectations of a more valuable  
 
Figure II.1: Average ADR and H-share discounts of Chinese cross-listed companies 
 
Note: This figure shows the averaged ADR and H-share discounts for the sample companies in the period 
December 1998 to February 2009 (see Table II.A1 in Appendix II for the list of included companies). The ADR 
and H-share discounts are computed using Eqs. II.3 and II.5.  
 
yuan relative to the U.S. dollar. The highest values for ADR and H-share discounts were -
13% in July 2005 and -20% in April 2006, respectively. These peaks occurred following the 
Chinese government’s decision to move from a peg to the U.S. dollar to a managed float in 
July 2005. On July 21, 2005, the yuan was revaluated by 2% from 8.27 to 8.11 yuan/U.S. 
dollar. Subsequent revaluations fed expectations of a lower yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate 
resulting in near record high values of ADR and H-share discounts to between -35% and -
13% in 2005 and 2006.  
The outbreak of the subprime lending crisis in 2007 was associated with lower ADR 
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discounts may partly reflect a fundamental change in exchange rate expectations. In an effort 
to shield the domestic export industry from unfavorable world market conditions, Chinese 
authorities stopped revaluating the yuan against the U.S. dollar from July 2008 to June 2010,  
thereby disrupting expectations of future yuan appreciations (in the observation period of this 
paper). The subprime lending crisis may also have had a negative impact on investors’ 
assessments of the yuan’s fair fundamental value against the U.S. dollar. China’s growth in 
exports and labor productivity slowed in 2008 and 2009, which negatively affects the yuan’s 
fair value. The Chinese banking system is suffering from bad loans, feeding expectations of 
large-scale bank re-capitalizations that could lead to inflationary pressure and, in turn, to a 
less valuable yuan.  
 
II.4 Forecasting performance of ADR and H-share investors’ exchange rate expectations 
In order to test the ability of ADR and H-share discounts to forecast changes in the yuan/U.S. 
dollar exchange rate, I apply a “rolling regressions” framework. That is, I estimate a 
regression model that explains the actual exchange rate change using ADR or H-share 
discounts in sample, produce an out-of-sample forecast, move the sample one observation 
forward, and repeat the procedure until the sample observations are exhausted. The in-sample 
forecasting regression models for ADR and H-share discounts are outlined in Eqs. (II.7) and 
(II.8): 

































11 ,   (II.8) 
where the first difference in the k periods ahead percentage change of the yuan/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate is regressed on the first difference in the ADR or H-share discount. I estimate 
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the model in first differences for two reasons. Firstly, ADR and H-share discounts of many 
included companies contain unit roots in levels. Using stationary time series in first 
differences avoids the problem of spurious regressions caused by unit root processes (see 
Chapter V). Secondly, the first difference of ADR/H-share discounts can easily be interpreted 
in terms of the change in exchange rate expectations as explained in the following. Assume 
that the expected exchange rate incorporated in the ADR discount (see Eq., II.4) measures 
ADR investors’ k periods ahead forecast of the exchange rate, i.e. ADR investors expect the 
exchange rate to change from tS  today to 
exp
iktS  in kt  , which equals an expected exchange 
rate change of   expexp iktikttikt SSSg   percent. Using Eq. (II.4) one can show that the first 
difference in ADR discounts measures the change in depreciation expectations, i.e. 
1 iktikt1-itit ggdiscount ADRdiscount ADR .
26
 Thus, the forecasting model tests whether 
the today’s change in ADR or H-share investors’ depreciation expectations helps to forecast 
the change in the realized depreciation in the next k periods.             
 I apply the forecasting model to exchange rate changes in the managed float period from 
July 21, 2005 to the end of February 2009 (the end of the observation period of this paper).
27
 
Since the forecasting period is relatively short, I use weekly data to produce and evaluate a 
reasonable number of exchange rate forecasts. To evaluate the quality of the forecasts, I use 
six different forecast horizons k: one month, two months, six months, one year, two years, and 
five years. The forecasting models (Eqs. II.7 and II.8) are estimated using 52 consecutive 
weekly observations. For each forecast horizon/ADR or H-share pair I estimate 137 in-sample 
regressions.
28
 I use six ADR and 20 H-share pairs.
29
 For each in-sample estimation, I use the 
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 This holds analogously for H-shares. 
27
 Exchange rate changes in the peg regime before July 21, 2005 cannot be considered since the yuan/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate was fixed and thus every forecasting model would fail to provide reasonable predictions.   
28
 The considered floating rate period (July 21, 2005 to end of February 2009) spans 189 weeks. Since the first 
52 weeks are needed to produce in-sample estimates I can produce 137 forecasts.      
29
 The ADRs and H-shares used in the forecasting models represent only a sub-sample of the shares used in the 
panel regression analysis in Section II.5. For the forecasting exercises in this section, I exclude some companies 
because their shares started trading after the beginning of the five year forecasting horizon in July 2000.  
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model parameters ( ik  and ik ) and the next period change in the ADR or H-share discounts 
to produce an out-of-sample forecast. This out-of-sample forecast is then compared with the 
realized percentage change in the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate within the forecast horizon 
of k weeks. In total, this analysis relies on more than 21,000 exchange rate forecasts. 
To evaluate the forecasting quality of each model, I use the direction of change 
statistic and the mean squared error (MSE) ratio. The direction of change statistic is calculated 
as the number of forecasts with correct predictions of the direction of exchange rate change 
over the total number of predictions (137). Values above (below) 50% indicate better (worse) 
forecasting ability than a random walk. To assess whether the direction of change statistic is 
significantly different from 0.5, Diebold and Mariano (1995) propose the test statistic 
  Tdik /25.05.0 , where ikd  denotes the direction of change statistic and T  is the number 
of forecasts. Under the null of 5.0ikd  this test statistic is distributed as standard normal. 
As a second evaluation criterion I use the ratio between the MSE
30
 of the ADR/H-
share-based forecast and the MSE of the forward exchange rate-based forecast.
31
 MSE ratios 
above (below) one indicate that ADR/H-share discounts have worse (better) forecasting 
ability than forward exchange rates. To test the significance of the MSE ratio, I use the 
Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic (DM-statistic), which tests the null that the difference 






, is zero. Using the mean of iktL , ikL , and the 
variance,  ikLvar  , the DM-statistic is calculated as  ikik LvarL  and distributed standard 
normal. A significantly negative (positive) DM-statistic indicates that ADR/H-shares produce 
better (worse) forecasts than forward exchange rates. The results of the evaluation of the  
                                                 
30
 The MSE equals the average of the squared differences between the forecasted exchange rate and the realized 
exchange rate. 
31
 I calculate the out-of-sample forecasts of forward rates using the week-over-week change in the forward 
premium (i.e. the percentage deviation of the forward exchange rate over the spot exchange rate) in a forecasting 
equation similar to Eqs. (II.7) and (II.8). For each forecast horizon k I use the forward rates with the same 
maturity k. 
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forecast models are presented in Tables II.1 and II.2. Table II.1 reports the direction of change 
statistics of the ADR and H-share forecast models for each forecast horizon together with the 
associated t-values. A direction of change statistic significantly greater than (lower than) 0.5 
indicates better (worse) forecasting ability than a random walk. For short forecast horizons 
(one month to one year) I find that the direction of change statistic is not significantly 
different from 0.5 for almost all stock pairs indicating that ADR and H-share discounts do not 
predict changes in the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate significantly better than the random 
walk. For long forecast horizons (two years and five years) I find that the direction of change 
statistic is significantly greater than 0.5 for almost all ADR and H-share pairs indicating that 
ADR and H-share discounts tend to predict the correct direction of exchange rate change in 
the long run. This result resembles the conclusion of the literature, that the random walk beats 
exchange rate forecast models in the short run while some models perform well in the long 
run.   
 Table II.2 reports the MSE ratio between ADR/H-share-based and forward rate-based 
forecasts together with the DM-statistic. MSE ratios below (above) one and a significantly 
negative (positive) DM-statistic indicate that ADR/H-shares have better (worse) forecasting 
ability than forward exchange rates. The results indicate that for all forecast horizons ADR 
and H-share discounts are significantly more accurate in forecasting yuan/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate changes than forward exchange rates. A possible explanation for the poor 
forecasting performance of forward rates may be that the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) 
intervenes in the forward exchange market in order to influence investors’ exchange rate 
expectations, thereby facilitating the conduct of its exchange rate policy. In the recent 
managed floating period beginning in July 2005 the PBoC may have been interested in 
systematically increasing the yuan/U.S. dollar forward exchange rate, thereby cushioning 
expectations toward more yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar in order to reject U.S.  
calls to more yuan appreciation. 
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Table II.1: Direction of change statistics of out-of-sample forecasts  
 Forecast horizon 
 1 month 2 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 5 years 
ADRs             
China Eastern Airlines ADR 0.445  0.489  0.540  0.504  0.620  0.664  
 (-1.282)  (-0.256)  (0.940)  (0.085)  (2.819) *** (3.845) *** 
Shanghai Chlor Chemical ADR 0.460  0.489  0.526  0.518  0.606  0.664  
 (-0.940)  (-0.256)  (0.598)  (0.427)  (2.478) ** (3.845) *** 
Shanghai Erfangji ADR 0.518  0.445  0.504  0.547  0.620  0.650  
 (0.427)  (-1.282)  (0.085)  (1.111)  (2.819) *** (3.503) *** 
Sinopec Shanghai ADR 0.496  0.467  0.540  0.518  0.628  0.657  
 (-0.085)  (-0.769)  (0.940)  (0.427)  (2.990) *** (3.674) *** 
Tsingtao Brewery ADR 0.482  0.482  0.533  0.504  0.628  0.657  
 (-0.427)  (-0.427)  (0.769)  (0.085)  (2.990) *** (3.674) *** 
Yanzhou Coal Mining ADR 0.467  0.445  0.533  0.511  0.628  0.672  
 (-0.769)  (-1.282)  (0.769)  (0.256)  (2.990) *** (4.015) *** 
H-shares             
Angang Steel H-share 0.467  0.511  0.547  0.496  0.584  0.664  
 (-0.769)  (0.256)  (1.111)  (-0.085)  (1.965) ** (3.845) *** 
Beiren Printing Machines H-share 0.474  0.460  0.518  0.540  0.620  0.672  
 (-0.598)  (-0.940)  (0.427)  (0.940)  (2.819) *** (4.015) *** 
China Eastern Airlines H-share 0.423  0.401  0.518  0.526  0.613  0.664  
 (-1.794) * (-2.307) ** (0.427)  (0.598)  (2.649) *** (3.845) *** 
Dofang Electric H-share 0.467  0.445  0.511  0.504  0.555  0.679  
 (-0.769)  (-1.282)  (0.256)  (0.085)  (1.282)  (4.186) *** 
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Guangzhou Pharmaceutical H-share 0.504  0.526  0.453  0.555  0.613  0.664  
 (0.085)  (0.598)  (-1.111)  (1.282)  (2.649) *** (3.845) *** 
Guangzhou Shipyard H-share 0.445  0.518  0.504  0.511  0.591  0.664  
 (-1.282)  (0.427)  (0.085)  (0.256)  (2.136) ** (3.845) *** 
Hisense Kelon Electrical H-share 0.467  0.496  0.533  0.540  0.620  0.672  
 (-0.769)  (-0.085)  (0.769)  (0.940)  (2.819) *** (4.015) *** 
Jiangsu Expressway H-share 0.467  0.482  0.533  0.540  0.591  0.679  
 (-0.769)  (-0.427)  (0.769)  (0.940)  (2.136) ** (4.186) *** 
Jingwei Textile Machines H-share 0.489  0.533  0.540  0.555  0.606  0.672  
 (-0.256)  (0.769)  (0.940)  (1.282)  (2.478) ** (4.015) *** 
Luoyang Glass H-share 0.467  0.504  0.518  0.526  0.620  0.664  
 (-0.769)  (0.085)  (0.427)  (0.598)  (2.819) *** (3.845) *** 
Maanshan Iron & Steel H-share 0.474  0.526  0.540  0.511  0.606  0.657  
 (-0.598)  (0.598)  (0.940)  (0.256)  (2.478) ** (3.674) *** 
Nanjing Panda Electronic H-share 0.474  0.496  0.518  0.555  0.577  0.664  
 (-0.598)  (-0.085)  (0.427)  (1.282)  (1.794) * (3.845) *** 
Northeast Electric H-share 0.496  0.555  0.518  0.496  0.606  0.664  
 (-0.085)  (1.282)  (0.427)  (-0.085)  (2.478) ** (3.845) *** 
Shandong Xinhua Pharma H-share  0.511  0.555  0.482  0.511  0.620  0.664  
 (0.256)  (1.282)  (-0.427)  (0.256)  (2.819) *** (3.845) *** 
Shenji Group Kumato H-share 0.489  0.474  0.496  0.518  0.620  0.657  
 (-0.256)  (-0.598)  (-0.085)  (0.427)  (2.819) *** (3.674) *** 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemicals H-share 0.496  0.489  0.540  0.482  0.635  0.650  
 (-0.085)  (-0.256)  (0.940)  (-0.427)  (3.161) *** (3.503) *** 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemcial H-share 0.467  0.489  0.504  0.504  0.577  0.657  
 (-0.769)  (-0.256)  (0.085)  (0.085)  (1.794) * (3.674) *** 
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Tianjin Capital H-share 0.482  0.453  0.518  0.504  0.591  0.672  
 (-0.427)  (-1.111)  (0.427)  (0.085)  (2.136) ** (4.015) *** 
Tsingtao Brewery H-share 0.511  0.460  0.533  0.504  0.635  0.664  
 (0.256)  (-0.940)  (0.769)  (0.085)  (3.161) *** (3.845) *** 
Yanzhou Coal Mining H-share 0.504  0.496  0.562  0.496  0.606  0.672  
 (0.085)  (-0.085)  (1.452)  (-0.085)  (2.478) ** (4.015) *** 
Note: This table presents the direction of change statistics of the out-of-sample forecasts for the period July 21, 2005 to February 23, 2009. The first 
entry in each cell is the direction of change statistic defined as the number of ADR/H-share-based forecasts with correct predictions of the direction 
of exchange rate change over the total number of predictions. The second entry in each cell is the t-value (in parentheses) testing the null that the 






 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.   
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Table II.2: MSE ratios and Diebold-Mariano statistics of out-of-sample forecasts  
 Forecast horizon 
 1 month 2 months 6 months 1 year 2 years 5 years 
ADRs             
China Eastern Airlines ADR 0.582  0.470  0.340  0.526  0.237  0.010  
 (-1.864) * (-1.734) * (-2.168) ** (-1.739) * (-4.702) *** (-5.396) *** 
Shanghai Chlor Chemical ADR 0.582  0.472  0.340  0.518  0.241  0.010  
 (-1.841) * (-1.772) * (-2.177) ** (-1.830) * (-4.721) *** (-5.398) *** 
Shanghai Erfangji ADR 0.581  0.482  0.332  0.511  0.237  0.010  
 (-1.888) * (-1.756) * (-2.206) ** (-1.851) * (-4.780) *** (-5.399) *** 
Sinopec Shanghai ADR 0.588  0.467  0.338  0.521  0.241  0.010  
 (-1.941) * (-1.764) * (-2.168) ** (-1.785) * (-4.637) *** (-5.397) *** 
Tsingtao Brewery ADR 0.566  0.448  0.329  0.517  0.238  0.010  
 (-1.851) * (-1.751) * (-2.173) ** (-1.795) * (-4.658) *** (-5.397) *** 
Yanzhou Coal Mining ADR 0.576  0.469  0.336  0.523  0.236  0.010  
 (-1.869) * (-1.765) * (-2.183) ** (-1.777) * (-4.694) *** (-5.399) *** 
H-shares             
Angang Steel H-share 0.585  0.464  0.337  0.525  0.235  0.010  
 (-1.813) * (-1.732) * (-2.172) ** (-1.778) * (-4.693) *** (-5.394) *** 
Beiren Printing Machines H-share 0.575  0.466  0.338  0.527  0.231  0.009  
 (-1.858) * (-1.774) * (-2.173) ** (-1.756) * (-4.834) *** (-5.398) *** 
China Eastern Airlines H-share 0.588  0.485  0.340  0.540  0.238  0.010  
 (-1.846) * (-1.691) * (-2.165) ** (-1.775) * (-4.682) *** (-5.397) *** 
Dofang Electric H-share 0.577  0.475  0.346  0.535  0.240  0.010  
 (-1.809) * (-1.731) * (-2.137) ** (-1.708) * (-4.654) *** (-5.397) *** 
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Guangzhou Pharmaceutical H-share 0.577  0.472  0.336  0.520  0.244  0.010  
 (-1.886) * (-1.726) * (-2.177) ** (-1.788) * (-4.605) *** (-5.397) *** 
Guangzhou Shipyard H-share 0.582  0.455  0.352  0.537  0.255  0.009  
 (-1.829) * (-1.789) * (-2.083) ** (-1.680) * (-4.461) *** (-5.395) *** 
Hisense Kelon Electrical H-share 0.583  0.473  0.342  0.510  0.235  0.009  
 (-1.896) * (-1.774) * (-2.178) ** (-1.810) * (-4.716) *** (-5.399) *** 
Jiangsu Expressway H-share 0.582  0.468  0.332  0.517  0.239  0.010  
 (-1.780) * (-1.772) * (-2.185) ** (-1.824) * (-4.646) *** (-5.398) *** 
Jingwei Textile Machines H-share 0.569  0.469  0.338  0.531  0.240  0.010  
 (-1.846) * (-1.759) * (-2.157) ** (-1.718) * (-4.617) *** (-5.396) *** 
Luoyang Glass H-share 0.566  0.472  0.344  0.520  0.238  0.010  
 (-1.846) * (-1.763) * (-2.185) ** (-1.836) * (-4.685) *** (-5.398) *** 
Maanshan Iron & Steel H-share 0.570  0.453  0.339  0.522  0.235  0.009  
 (-1.890) * (-1.800) * (-2.119) ** (-1.805) * (-4.661) *** (-5.397) *** 
Nanjing Panda Electronic H-share 0.581  0.463  0.345  0.525  0.242  0.010  
 (-1.896) * (-1.757) * (-2.141) ** (-1.790) * (-4.535) *** (-5.397) *** 
Northeast Electric H-share 0.589  0.466  0.373  0.543  0.239  0.010  
 (-1.949) * (-1.737) * (-1.978) ** (-1.676) * (-4.693) *** (-5.396) *** 
Shandong Xinhua Pharma H-share  0.580  0.448  0.336  0.518  0.236  0.010  
 (-1.815) * (-1.776) * (-2.181) ** (-1.814) * (-4.712) *** (-5.400) *** 
Shenji Group Kumato H-share 0.574  0.469  0.335  0.525  0.239  0.009  
 (-1.858) * (-1.725) * (-2.169) ** (-1.763) * (-4.612) *** (-5.399) *** 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemicals H-share 0.588  0.463  0.334  0.518  0.240  0.010  
 (-1.950) * (-1.781) * (-2.175) ** (-1.800) * (-4.635) *** (-5.396) *** 
Sinopec Yizheng Chemcial H-share 0.582  0.465  0.343  0.541  0.244  0.009  
 (-1.943) * (-1.765) * (-2.145) ** (-1.662) * (-4.484) *** (-5.400) *** 
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Tianjin Capital H-share 0.579  0.474  0.339  0.529  0.240  0.009  
 (-1.880) * (-1.719) * (-2.161) ** (-1.735) * (-4.704) *** (-5.399) *** 
Tsingtao Brewery H-share 0.576  0.456  0.332  0.522  0.237  0.010  
 (-1.835) * (-1.760) * (-2.168) ** (-1.778) * (-4.621) *** (-5.397) *** 
Yanzhou Coal Mining H-share 0.579  0.465  0.336  0.526  0.236  0.010  
 (-1.889) * (-1.789) * (-2.163) ** (-1.761) * (-4.666) *** (-5.399) *** 
Note: This table presents the MSE ratios and the Diebold-Mariano statistics of the out-of-sample forecasts for the period July 21, 2005 to 
February 23, 2009. The first entry in each cell is the MSE ratio defined as the ratio between the MSE of the ADR/H-share-based forecast and the 
MSE of forward rate-based forecast. The second entry in each cell reports the Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic (in parentheses) testing the 







denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level.   
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I conclude that the exchange rate expectations incorporated in ADR and H-share discounts are 
informative about the long-run direction of change of the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate and 
that ADR and H-share discounts have better forecasting ability than forward exchange rates at 
all forecast horizons tested. 
 
II.5 Determinants of ADR and H-share investors’ exchange rate expectations 
In this section I study how ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate expectations. 
In Section II.5.1 I present eight variables that, according to theory, determine exchange rates. 
I hypothesize that these variables also determine ADR and H-share investors’ exchange rate 
expectations. In Section II.5.2 I use panel regressions to test these hypotheses.  
 
II.5.1 Hypotheses 
II.5.1.1 The incentive to devaluate competitively 
Several papers show the importance of competitive devaluations to explain the development 
of exchange rates (for example, Fernald et al., 1999; Glick and Rose, 1999; Corsetti et al., 
2000). If ADR and H-share investors anticipate the temptation for the Chinese government to 
devaluate the yuan competitively in order to promote export growth, I expect that a higher 
degree of yuan overvaluation will lead to expectations towards more yuan depreciation. To 
measure real overvaluation of the yuan, I use data on JP Morgan’s real effective trade-
weighted exchange rate index, which weights changes in the yuan’s bilateral real exchange 
rates with bilateral trade.
32
 To measure relative overvaluation of the yuan, I compute the 
percentage deviation of the exchange rate index from its linear time trend. Higher values 
indicate higher yuan overvaluation.      
 
                                                 
32
 All data is taken from Datastream. 
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Hypothesis 1: A more overvalued yuan increases the incentive to devaluate the yuan 
competitively, which increases the yuan’s depreciation expectations and lowers ADR and H-
share discounts.    
 
II.5.1.2 Relative purchasing power parity (PPP) 
The relative PPP assumes that the bilateral real exchange rate is constant over time. 
According to relative PPP, the yuan depreciates (appreciates) against the U.S. dollar when 
Chinese inflation exceeds (trails) U.S. inflation. Several studies find evidence in favor of the 
relative PPP (for example, Lothian, 1990; Lothian and Taylor, 1996; Lothian and Simaan, 
1998; Taylor et al., 2001; Sarno and Valente, 2006).
33
 If ADR and H-share investors believe 
in the validity of relative PPP, they will expect a relatively weaker yuan when Chinese 
inflation increases relative to U.S. inflation. To test the validity of relative PPP, I use the 
difference between Chinese and U.S. inflation taken from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s International Financial Statistics. 
 
Hypothesis 2: In accordance with relative purchasing power parity (PPP), a larger inflation 
differential between China and the United States increases the yuan’s depreciation 
expectations and, thus, lowers ADR and H-share discounts.    
 
II.5.1.3 Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) effect 
According to the HBS hypothesis higher labor productivity growth in China, relative to the 
United States, leads to real appreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar.
34
 While Chinn 
(2000), Bergin et al. (2006), and Thomas and King (2008) find empirical support for the HBS 
                                                 
33
 See Rogoff (1996) and Taylor and Taylor (2004) for excellent surveys on PPP. 
34
 See Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964), and Samuelson (1964). Increasing labor productivity in the tradable goods 
sector leads to nominal wage increases in this sector. Perfect labor mobility implies that nominal wages in the 
non-tradable goods sector, where labor productivity is assumed to be constant, increase by the same amount, 
thereby increasing the prices of non-tradable goods. Thus, higher labor productivity leads to higher inflation, 
which, in turn, causes the domestic currency to appreciate in real terms. 
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effect, Cheung et al. (2007) and Lothian and Taylor (2008) find weak evidence. I quantify the 
HBS effect by measuring the labor productivity of China relative to the United States. To do 
so, I first divide real GDP per capita in China (provided by the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China) by real GDP per capita in the United States (provided by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). I then compute the percentage deviation of relative GDP per capita from its linear 
time trend.  
 
Hypothesis 3: In accordance with the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) effect, a larger 
productivity differential between China and the United States increases the yuan’s 
appreciation expectations and, thus, raises ADR and H-share discounts.    
 
II.5.1.4 Uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) 
UIP asserts that the returns on Chinese and U.S. risk-less assets are equal in exchange rate-
adjusted terms. Higher interest rates in China relative to the United States should therefore 
indicate expected depreciation of the yuan against the U.S. dollar. Most studies that use short 
forecast horizons find evidence against the validity of UIP (Froot and Thaler, 1990; Flood and 
Rose, 2002). Some studies that use long-term interest rates confirm UIP (Lothian and Simaan, 
1998) while others find mixed results (Meredith and Chinn, 1998; Chinn, 2006). In order to 
test the validity of the UIP, I use the difference between the three-month interbank interest 
rates of China (taken from the PBoC) and those of the United States (taken from the British 
Bankers Association).  
 
Hypothesis 4: In accordance with the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), a larger interest 
rate differential between China and the United States increases the yuan’s depreciation 
expectations, which, in turn, lowers ADR and H-share discounts.    
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II.5.1.5 Foreign exchange reserves growth 
The PBoC manages the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate by systematically buying U.S. dollars 
against yuan at the foreign exchange market. An increase in China’s foreign exchange 
reserves may affect ADR and H-share investors’ exchange rate expectations in two ways. 
First, higher reserve growth may indicate more undervaluation of the yuan. The more 
undervalued the yuan, the more foreign exchange reserves the PBoC must buy to maintain the 
(intentionally undervalued) yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate. That is, faster foreign exchange 
reserves growth may increase the yuan’s appreciation expectations. On the contrary, faster 
foreign exchange reserves growth may also increase the yuan’s depreciation expectations. 
This is because unsterilized reserve accumulation increases money supply in China and may 
eventually lead to inflation and yuan depreciation. I use data on the monthly percentage 
change in foreign exchange reserves plus gold provided by the PBoC. 
 
Hypothesis 5: The impact of foreign exchange reserve growth on the ADR and H-share 
discounts is not clear a priori. Faster foreign exchange reserve growth may increase or 
decrease the yuan’s appreciation expectations. 
 
II.5.1.6 Export growth 
The fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) approach relates the equilibrium level of 
exchange rates to a current account target an economy reaches in the long run (Williamson, 
1994; Isard, 2007). The FEER approach asserts that large current account surpluses produced 
by high export growth in China will fall in the long run as the yuan appreciates against the 
U.S. dollar. Higher export growth (provided by the General Administration of Customs 
China) thus increases expectations of yuan appreciation against the U.S. dollar.  
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Hypothesis 6: In accordance with the fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER) 
approach, faster export growth in China increases the yuan’s appreciation expectations and, 
thus, raises ADR and H-share discounts. 
 
II.5.1.7 Risk of twin banking and currency crisis 
Currency and banking crises often occur together (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). A banking 
crisis may force the central bank – acting as a lender of last resort – to bail out troubled banks 
by printing money which, in turn, produces inflationary pressure that can lead to a currency 
crisis (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Velasco, 1987; Calvo, 1998; Miller, 2000). The connection 
between banking and currency crises suggests using a banking crisis indicator in the analysis. 
To measure banking crisis risk, I divide domestic credit (obtained from the PBoC) by GDP 
(provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China). A higher ratio of domestic credit to 
GDP is presumably associated with a higher share of bad loans in domestic banks’ loan 
portfolios and thus indicates higher banking crisis risk (Kaminsky, 2006). 
 
Hypothesis 7: If ADR and H-share investors anticipate the risk of a twin banking and 
currency crisis, higher ratios of domestic credit to GDP, which indicate greater banking crisis 
risk, increase the yuan’s depreciation expectations and lower ADR and H-share discounts.   
 
II.5.1.8 Risk of twin sovereign debt and currency crisis 
Several studies confirm the frequent incidence of twin sovereign debt and currency crises 
(Reinhart, 2002; Dreher et al., 2006; Herz and Tong, 2008). To capture the dependency 
between both types of crises, many approaches apply a second-generation currency crisis 
framework (Bauer et al., 2003; Benigno and Missale, 2004). A general finding is that a twin 
debt and currency crisis is more probable if a country’s government is highly-indebted. As 
both types of crises are interrelated, sovereign debt crisis indicators may be useful indicators 
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for exchange rate expectations as well. In order to measure the risk of sovereign debt crisis, I 
use data on the redemption yield of China’s sovereign bonds taken from JP Morgan’s 
Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global. The EMBI includes the most liquid Brady 
and Eurobond issues of the respective country and is widely used in the literature on 
sovereign debt crises. Higher EMBI sovereign yields indicate a higher sovereign default risk, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 8: If ADR and H-share investors anticipate the risk of a twin sovereign debt and 
currency crisis, higher EMBI sovereign yields, which indicate greater risk of a sovereign debt 
crisis, will increase the yuan’s depreciation expectations and, thus, lower ADR and H-share 
discounts.  
 
II.5.2 Panel regression analysis 
In addition to the exchange rate determinants discussed in Section II.5.1, I include ten control 
variables in the regressions. In accordance with Arquette et al. (2008) and Burdekin and 
Redfern (2009) I include the non-deliverable yuan/U.S. dollar forward premium in order to 
control for the impact of the forward exchange rate rate on ADR and H-share discounts.
35
 
Liquidity conditions are also found to affect price spreads of cross-listed stocks (Sun and 
Tong, 2000; Chen et al., 2001; Wang and Jiang, 2004; Chan et al., 2008). To measure 
liquidity conditions I use the relative turnover ratio defined as the monthly trading volume of 
the ADR or H-share over the monthly trading volume of the A-share. I expect that better 
liquidity conditions of the ADR or H-share relative to the A-share lead to falling relative A-
share returns and, in turn, to higher ADR or H-share discounts. To control for company size, I 
include the company’s market capitalization measured in trillions of yuan. I expect that larger 
firms have lower trading costs and that price discovery after news is released is quicker, 
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 The forward premium is calculated as the percentage deviation of the one-year non-deliverable yuan/U.S. 
dollar forward exchange rate over the yuan/U.S. dollar spot exchange rate.  
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thereby reducing the scope of news-driven changes in the discounts. Several authors find that 
ADR and H-share discounts react to differences in market-specific risks (Froot and Dabora, 
1999; Kim et al., 2000; Wang and Jiang, 2004). I include the return differential between the 
Chinese A-share market (as measured by the Shanghai SE A-share Index) and the U.S. market 
(as measured by the S&P 500 Index) or the Hong Kong market (as measured by the Hang 
Seng Index). I expect that a higher risk of the Chinese stock market relative to the U.S. or 
Hong Kong stock market leads to higher relative A-share returns and thus to lower ADR and 
H-share discounts.  
Several papers find that investor sentiments influence the relative prices of cross-listed 
stocks and their underlyings (for example, Kim et al., 2000; Arquette et al., 2008; Burdekin 
and Redfern, 2009). In accordance to Arquette et al. (2008) I measure investor sentiment 
towards the Chinese stock market relative to the U.S. or Hong Kong stock market using the 
relative market price-earnings (P/E) ratio, the relative market price-cash flow (P/CF) ratio, 
and the relative market price-book (P/B) ratio. I calculate the relative market P/E, P/CF, and 
P/B ratios by dividing the P/E, P/CF, and P/B ratio of the Chinese stock market by the P/E, 
P/CF, and P/B ratio of the U.S. stock market (for ADRs) or the Hong Kong stock market (for 
H-shares).
36
 I measure investor sentiments towards individual companies using the relative 
company P/E, P/CF, and P/B ratios, which are calculated by dividing the P/E, P/CF, and P/B 
ratio of the A-share by the P/E, P/CF, and P/B ratio of the Chinese stock market as a whole.
37
 
I expect higher relative market and company P/E, P/CF, and P/B ratios to be associated with 
lower ADR and H-share discounts because more positive investor sentiments towards the 
Chinese stock market or individual stocks increase the relative price investors are willing to 
pay for the Chinese A-shares compared to ADRs or H-shares. All data is taken from 
Datastream. 
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 The P/E, P/CF, and P/B ratios of the stock markets are taken from the broad Datastream Global Equity Index 
for each stock market available from Datastream.   
37
 As proposed by Arquette et al. (2008), I use the relative company P/E, P/CF, and P/B ratios in natural logs (to 
reduce the impact of outliers on the results) and one period lagged. 
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To test the hypotheses, I use panel regressions for ADR and H-share discounts as 










ktkit xxdiscount share-H    .                      (II.10)   
The ADR (H-share) discount of company i  in month t  is regressed on a constant  , on k  
variables which do not vary across companies, ktx , i.e., the eight macroeconomic variables 
outlined in Section II.5.1 plus the forward premium, the market return differential, and the 
relative market P/E, P/CF, and P/B ratios, and on j  company-specific variables, jitx , i.e., the 
relative trading volume, the market capitalization, and the relative company P/E, P/CF, and 
P/B ratios. k  and j  are the coefficients; i  is the company-specific fixed effects; it  is the 
error.  
The ADR and H-share discounts are calculated as outlined in Eqs. (II.3) and (II.5). 
The ADR and H-share panels consist of 22 ADR/A-share pairs and 52 H-share/A-share pairs 
in the period December 1998 to February 2009. The companies included are listed in Table 
II.A1 in Appendix II. Table II.A2 in Appendix II shows the summary statistics of the 
variables. The analysis is restricted to monthly data, which is the highest frequency at which 
macroeconomic data is available. I test for unit roots using the panel unit root tests of Im et al. 
(2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999).
38
 Under the null of each test, the variable contains a unit 
root. Table II.A3 in Appendix II reports the results of the panel unit root tests. Variables with 
a unit root in levels are used in first differences as indicated by a Δ in the results tables. I 
consequently use the yuan’s overvaluation, the productivity differential,  
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 Chapter V provides a short overview of (panel) unit root tests.    
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the interest rate differential (in the ADR panel), and domestic credit to GDP in first 
differences in the estimations. The estimation results for the ADR and H-share panels are  
reported in Tables II.3 and II.4. 
For each panel, I estimate eight specifications. The first specification only includes the 
eight macroeconomic determinants. In each of the following specifications I include an 
additional control variable: the yuan/U.S. dollar forward premium (II); the relative trading 
volume (III); the market capitalization (IV); and the return differential (V). Specifications 
(VI), (VII), and (VIII) additionally include investor sentiment variables based on the P/E, 
P/CF, and P/B ratio. Each regression includes company fixed effects.
39
 The t-values are 
computed using robust standard errors clustered by company in order to control for 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. A positive coefficient indicates that a higher value of 
the exogenous variable increases the ADR or H-share discount reflecting expectations of a 
relatively more valuable yuan, i.e. more yuan appreciation, or, equivalently, less yuan 
depreciation against the U.S. dollar. Accordingly, a negative coefficient indicates that a higher 
value of the exogenous variable lowers the ADR or H-share discount reflecting expectations 
of a relatively less valuable yuan, i.e. more yuan depreciation, or, equivalently, less yuan 
appreciation against the U.S. dollar.    
 The estimation results for both panels confirm many of the hypotheses outlined in Section 
II.5.1. For 15 of the 16 specifications I find a negative and significant coefficient for the 
overvaluation of the yuan, which provides evidence for the competitive devaluations 
hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). This result suggests that ADR and H-share investors appear to 
anticipate that a more overvalued yuan may be an incentive for the Chinese government to 
devaluate the yuan in order to restore the competitiveness of the Chinese export industry. 
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 I also tested whether a random effects model would be more appropriate than the applied fixed effects model 
using the Hausman (1978) specification test, which tests the null that the random and fixed effects coefficients 
are equal. The results of the Hausman test indicate significantly different coefficient values suggesting that the 
fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
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 Table II.3: Panel estimation results: ADR discounts 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  
Real overvaluation of yuan (Δ) -12.155  -74.752 ** -77.125 ** -75.296 *** -70.053 ** -69.917 *** -49.894 ** -45.706 * 
  (-0.40)  (-2.68)  (-2.77)  (-2.88)  (-2.67)  (-3.00)  (-2.57)  (-1.89)  
Inflation differential China vs. U.S. -2.308 *** -3.443 *** -3.487 *** -3.049 *** -3.014 *** -0.264  0.374  0.171  
  (-4.06)  (-6.09)  (-6.27)  (-5.24)  (-5.13)  (-0.52)  (0.78)  (0.36)  
Productivity differential China vs. U.S. (Δ) 8.924 *** 4.955 *** 4.925 *** 5.411 *** 5.310 *** 5.315 *** 4.550 *** 6.220 *** 
  (4.99)  (3.73)  (3.89)  (4.41)  (4.43)  (4.37)  (3.99)  (5.87)  
Interest rate differential China vs. U.S. (Δ) -6.212 *** -7.249 *** -7.231 *** -6.794 *** -7.201 *** -4.004 *** -3.058 *** -4.973 *** 
  (-3.97)  (-4.58)  (-4.59)  (-4.44)  (-4.89)  (-6.26)  (-3.56)  (-6.39)  
Foreign exchange reserves growth -0.172  -1.583 *** -1.582 *** -1.640 *** -1.569 *** -1.049 ** -2.346 *** -2.173 *** 
  (-0.41)  (-3.65)  (-3.63)  (-3.75)  (-3.66)  (-2.67)  (-4.95)  (-5.07)  
Export growth 0.050  -0.013  -0.011  -0.024  -0.023  -0.107 *** -0.123 *** -0.147 *** 
  (1.15)  (-0.28)  (-0.26)  (-0.60)  (-0.58)  (-3.06)  (-3.84)  (-4.29)  
Domestic credit to GDP (Δ) -0.493 *** -0.482 ** -0.478 ** -0.402 ** -0.447 ** 0.062  0.116  -0.030  
  (-2.94)  (-2.79)  (-2.75)  (-2.23)  (-2.58)  (0.52)  (0.98)  (-0.24)  
EMBI sovereign bond yield -8.081 *** -5.724 *** -5.705 *** -4.659 ** -4.799 *** -0.620  0.632  -3.132 ** 
  (-4.35)  (-3.33)  (-3.33)  (-2.79)  (-2.86)  (-0.49)  (0.49)  (-2.26)  
Yuan/USD forward premium   -2.348 *** -2.375 *** -2.623 *** -2.606 *** -2.574 *** -2.180 *** -2.726 *** 
   (-4.27)  (-3.97)  (-4.79)  (-4.79)  (-5.68)  (-6.75)  (-6.31)  
Relative trading volume A-share vs.     0.193  0.227  0.294  -0.235  -0.111  0.057  
 ADR     (0.28)  (0.38)  (0.49)  (-0.55)  (-0.31)  (0.12)  
Market capitalization       -0.306 *** -0.305 *** -0.124 ** -0.079  -0.098  
        (-3.24)  (-3.23)  (-2.18)  (-1.25)  (-1.48)  
Return differential China vs. U.S.         0.118 ** 0.301 *** 0.139 *** 0.260 *** 
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          (2.60)  (6.84)  (3.31)  (6.74)  
Relative company P/E ratio (in logs)           -0.003 ***     
            (-0.14)      
Relative market P/E ratio           -0.229 ***     
           (-7.67)      
Relative company P/CF ratio (in logs)             -0.044 ***   
              (-0.98)    
Relative market P/CF ratio             -0.312 ***   
             (-10.99)    
Relative company P/B ratio (in logs)               -0.025 *** 
                (-0.30)  
Relative market P/B ratio               -0.308 *** 
               (-8.14)  
Constant -0.054  -0.177 * -0.181 * -0.205 ** -0.200 *** -0.114 *** -0.074 *** 0.027 *** 
 (-0.60)  (-1.99)  (-2.01)  (-2.28)  (-2.22)  (-1.54)  (-0.92)  (0.37)  
F-statistic 23.1 *** 31.31 *** 27.47 *** 25.53 *** 23.19 *** 49.02 *** 35.99 *** 27.59 *** 
Within R-squared 0.207  0.285  0.285  0.32  0.323  0.521  0.594  0.498  
No. of observations 909  909  909  909  909  909  909  909  
Note: This table presents the results of the panel regressions for the ADR sample (see Eq., II.9) in the period December 1998 to February 2009. All estimations include company 












Table II.4: Panel estimation results: H-share discounts 
 I  II  III  IV  V  VI  VII  VIII  
Real overvaluation of yuan (Δ) -35.542 ** -68.201 *** -68.248 *** -68.802 *** -68.570 *** -77.840 *** -64.197 *** -66.555 *** 
  (-2.51)  (-4.73)  (-4.71)  (-4.81)  (-4.83)  (-6.22)  (-5.04)  (-4.65)  
Inflation differential China vs. U.S. -0.476  -1.348 *** -1.368 *** -1.171 *** -1.162 *** 0.419  0.573  -1.052 *** 
  (-1.32)  (-3.50)  (-3.62)  (-3.15)  (-3.13)  (1.33)  (1.64)  (-2.98)  
Productivity differential China vs. U.S.  7.614 *** 5.957 *** 5.917 *** 5.886 *** 5.763 *** 5.496 *** 6.797 *** 5.873 *** 
 (Δ) (8.99)  (6.51)  (6.47)  (6.54)  (6.24)  (6.92)  (8.28)  (6.62)  
Interest rate differential China vs. U.S. -6.830 *** -5.548 *** -5.474 *** -5.340 *** -5.462 *** -5.071 *** -4.015 *** -5.696 *** 
  (-9.86)  (-8.63)  (-8.88)  (-8.54)  (-8.85)  (-8.23)  (-6.89)  (-9.28)  
Foreign exchange reserves growth -0.888 *** -1.622 *** -1.609 *** -1.521 *** -1.560 *** -1.066 *** -1.735 *** -1.598 *** 
  (-3.26)  (-6.28)  (-6.28)  (-5.85)  (-6.06)  (-4.46)  (-6.53)  (-6.26)  
Export growth 0.071 *** 0.017  0.016  0.013  0.012  0.004  -0.018  0.006  
  (4.14)  (1.18)  (1.09)  (0.90)  (0.83)  (0.27)  (-1.39)  (0.41)  
Domestic credit to GDP (Δ) -0.644 *** -0.546 *** -0.542 *** -0.501 *** -0.505 *** -0.044  -0.297 *** -0.492 *** 
  (-7.24)  (-6.76)  (-6.78)  (-6.51)  (-6.61)  (-0.64)  (-4.33)  (-6.71)  
EMBI sovereign bond yield -13.222 *** -10.439 *** -10.349 *** -9.271 *** -9.359 *** -7.107 *** -5.380 *** -9.354 *** 
  (-8.20)  (-6.97)  (-6.93)  (-6.35)  (-6.42)  (-4.91)  (-4.06)  (-6.94)  
Yuan/USD forward premium   -1.465 *** -1.472 *** -1.844 *** -1.829 *** -1.236 *** -1.292 *** -1.717 *** 
   (-6.06)  (-6.09)  (-8.69)  (-8.78)  (-7.18)  (-9.53)  (-8.52)  
Relative trading volume A-share vs.     -8.8E-04  -8.6E-04  -1.0E-03  7.1E-04  -1.1E-03  -1.4E-03  
 H-share     (-0.63)  (-0.63)  (-0.74)  (0.61)  (-0.91)  (-1.06)  
Market capitalization       -0.608 *** -0.613 *** -0.338 *** -0.507 *** -0.619 *** 
        (-4.13)  (-4.17)  (-3.71)  (-4.10)  (-4.07)  
Return differential China vs. HK         -0.071 ** 0.111 *** 0.010  -0.075 * 
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          (-2.12)  (5.39)  (0.38)  (-2.21)  
Relative company P/E ratio (in logs)           -0.056 ***     
            (-3.53)      
Relative market P/E ratio           -0.155 ***     
           (-8.90)      
Relative company P/CF ratio (in logs)             -0.048 **   
              (-2.19)    
Relative market P/CF ratio             -0.216 ***   
             (-8.59)    
Relative company P/B ratio (in logs)               0.041  
                (1.22)  
Relative market P/B ratio               -0.022 *** 
               (-1.68)  
Constant 0.076  -0.060  -0.061  -0.084  -0.078 *** 0.099 *** 0.008 *** -0.076 *** 
 (1.00)  -(0.84)  -(0.85)  -(1.20)  -(1.11)  (1.24)  (0.11)  -(1.15)  
F-statistic 24.740 *** 22.600 *** 20.340 *** 25.230 *** 24.410 *** 30.390 *** 28.150 *** 24.870 *** 
Within R-squared 0.337  0.360  0.360  0.397  0.398  0.562  0.518  0.401  
No. of observations 2600  2600  2600  2600  2600  2600  2600  2600  
Note: This table presents the results of the panel regressions for the H-share sample (see Eq., II.10) in the period December 1998 to February 2009. All estimations include 










The coefficient of the inflation differential is significantly negative in ten of 16 specifications 
ranging from -2.3 to -3.5 in the ADR panel and from -1.1 to -1.4 in the H-share panel. That is, 
a 1% increase in inflation in China relative to the United States reduces ADR discounts by 
2.3% to 3.5% and H-share discounts by 1.1% to 1.4%. ADR and H-share investors appear to 
anticipate that higher inflation in China relative to the United States will contribute to a 
weakening of the yuan against the U.S. dollar. The results thus support the relative PPP 
(Hypothesis 2). 
 I also find evidence for the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect (Hypothesis 3). A higher 
productivity differential between China and the United States significantly increases ADR 
and H-share discounts in all specifications. ADR and H-share investors appear to anticipate 
that higher productivity growth in China relative to the United States will lead to a yuan 
appreciation in the long run, thereby driving up the discounts of cross-listed stocks. I also find 
robust evidence in favor of the uncovered interest rate parity hypothesis (Hypothesis 4). The 
coefficient for the interest rate differential is negative and significant in all specifications. 
This means that a 1% increase in the Chinese interest rate relative to the U.S. interest rate 
translates to a 3.1% to 7.2% decrease in ADR discounts and a 4% to 6.8% decrease in H-share 
discounts. Investors thus anticipate that the higher-interest rate currency will depreciate 
against the lower-interest rate currency. The coefficient of the foreign exchange reserve 
growth is negative and significant in most of the specifications. That is, ADR and H-share 
investors increase their depreciation expectations of the yuan when the pace of the reserve 
accumulation of the PBoC increases. This result suggests that ADR and H-share investors fear 
that unsterilized reserve accumulation may subsequently lead to monetary expansion and 
inflationary pressure in China which may weaken the yuan. The coefficient of export growth 
is insignificant in most of the specifications. Thus, I find no evidence for the validity of the 
FEER approach (Hypothesis 6).  
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The results provide evidence that ADR and H-share investors anticipate the risk of a 
twin banking and currency crisis in China (Hypothesis 7). A higher ratio of domestic credit to 
GDP, which indicates higher banking crisis risk, significantly reduces ADR and H-share 
discounts for 12 of 16 specifications. This result suggests that the easy lending of Chinese 
banks increases the share of bad loans, which may lead to solvency-driven bank defaults 
(Setser, 2006). If the PBoC acts as a lender of last resort in the event of a banking crisis, the 
recapitalization of banks may lead to excessive money creation and inflation, which could 
lead to a devaluation of the yuan. The results also indicate that ADR and H-share investors 
anticipate the risk of a twin debt and currency crisis (Hypothesis 8). For 14 of 16 
specifications, I find that higher EMBI sovereign bond yields significantly lower ADR and H-
share discounts. A rise in sovereign debt crisis risk in China thus translates into expectations 
of yuan depreciation against the U.S. dollar.     
 The results also confirm some of the hypotheses for the control variables. The coefficient 
of the forward premium is negative and significant in all specifications confirming the 
findings of Arquette et al. (2008) and Burdekin and Redfern (2009). This result suggests that 
higher depreciation expectations of the yuan against the U.S. dollar formed on the forward 
market spill over to the ADR and H-share market. The coefficient of relative trading volume 
is insignificant in all specifications, suggesting that liquidity conditions do not play an 
important role in my sample. The coefficient for the market capitalization is negative and 
significant for eight of ten specifications. This result suggests that larger companies have 
lower ADR or H-share discounts since they have lower trading costs and price discovery is 
quicker. For the return differential I find that ADRs are more correlated with the Chinese 
stock market than with the U.S. stock market, while the coefficients for H-shares have 
different signs. For five of six specifications, I find that better investor sentiment towards the 
individual A-share or the Chinese stock market significantly decreases ADR and H-share 




I show that the price discounts of ADRs and H-shares to their underlying A-shares can be 
used as an indicator of ADR and H-share investors’ expectations of the future yuan/U.S. 
dollar exchange rate. Using a rolling regressions forecasting framework I find that during the 
recent managed float period (July 2005 to February 2009) ADR and H-share discounts are 
more accurate in predicting changes in the yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate than the random 
walk or forward exchange rates, at least at forecast horizons longer than one year. Using a 
panel framework, I find that many macroeconomic variables which – theory has shown – 
determine exchange rates also have a significant impact on ADR and H-share investors’ 
exchange rate expectations. I find that ADR and H-share investors form their exchange rate 
expectations according to the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect, the risk of competitive 
devaluations, relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity, the risk of a 
twin banking and currency crisis, and the risk of a twin debt and currency crisis.  
 The results have implications for academics and practitioners. The forecasting exercises 
show that ADR and H-share discounts are helpful to predict changes in the yuan/U.S. dollar 
exchange rate, at least at long horizons. The PBoC might use the changes in ADR and H-
share discounts to measure the market-determined exchange rate expectations and to 
determine possible misalignments of the exchange rate. The upward trend in ADR and H-
share discounts prior to the float of the yuan in July 2005, for example, indicated that ADR 
and H-share investors expected a relatively stronger yuan. The PBoC may take advantage of 
ADR and H-share discounts to manage the timing and intensity of foreign exchange market 
interventions and realignments. Investors may use ADR and H-share discounts in order to 
speculate on exchange rate movements (particularly in the long run). The forecasting models 
indicate that ADR and H-share discounts are more accurate than forward rates in forecasting 
exchange rate changes. If, for example, ADR and H-share discounts indicate more (less) yuan 
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appreciation against the U.S. dollar than suggested by the forward exchange rate, a potentially 
profitable trading strategy may be to buy (sell) yuan against U.S. dollars at the forward 
market and make the reverse transaction at the spot market at maturity.        
The panel regressions show that the theoretical links between macroeconomic 
variables and exchange rates in most cases also apply to exchange rate expectations. This 
supports the validity of many exchange rate theories and substantiates the rationality of stock 
market investors’ expectations. What is more, my approach provides an opportunity to study 
exchange rates in managed floating regimes. The official yuan/U.S. dollar exchange rate is 
heavily managed by the PBoC, which implies that it is not the ideal measure to test exchange 
rate theories. ADR and H-share discounts, on the contrary, enable one to study the impact of 
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II. Appendix  
Table II.A1: Stock pairs included in the sample 
ADR panel 
Air China; Aluminium Corporation of China; Angang Steel; China Eastern Airlines; China 
Life Insurance; China Petroleum & Chemical; China Shipping Development; China Southern 
Airlines; Datang International Power Generation Company; Guangsheng Railway; Huaneng 
Power International; Jiangsu Expressway; Jiangxi Copper; Jilin Chemical Industry; 
Petrochina; Ping An Insurance; Shanghai Chlor Chemical; Shanghai Erfangji; Sinopec 
Shanghai Petrochemicals; Tianjin Capital Environmental Protection Group; Tsingtao 
Brewery; Yanzhou Coal Mining. 
 
H-share panel 
Air China; Aluminium Corporation of China; Angang Steel; Anhui Conch Cement; Anhui 
Expressway; Bank of China; Bank of Communications; Beijing North Star; Beiren Printing 
Machines; China Citic Bank; China Coal Energy; China Construction Bank; China Cosco 
Holdings; China Eastern Airlines; China Life Insurance; China Merchants Bank; China 
Railway Construction; China Shenhua Energy Company; China Shipping Development; 
China Southern Airlines; Datang International Power Generation Company; Dofang Electric; 
Guangsheng Railway; Guangzhou Pharmaceutical; Guangzhou Shipyard International; 
Hisense Kelon Electrical Holdings; Huadian Power International; Huaneng Power 
International; Industrial and Commercial Bank of China; Jiangsu Expressway; Jiangxi 
Copper; Jilin Chemical Industry; Jingwei Textile Machines; Luoyang Glass; Maanshan Iron 
& Steel; Nanjing Panda Electronic; Northeast Electric Development; Petrochina; Ping An 
Insurance; Shandong Chenming Paper Holdings; Shandong Xinhua Pharmaceutical; 
Shanghai Jin Jiang International Hotel Group; Shenji Group Kumato; Shenzhen Expressway; 
Sinopec Shanghai Petrochemicals; Sinopec Yizheng Chemcial Fibre; Tianjin Capital 
Environmental Protection Group; Tsingtao Brewery; Weichai Power; Xinjiang Tianye Water 
Saving   Irrigation System; Yanzhou Coal Mining; ZTE. 
Note: Information on ADRs is taken from the internet databases of JP Morgan (www.adr.com) and Bank of 




Table II.A2: Summary statistics for the variables of the ADR and H-share samples 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Real overvaluation of yuan (Δ) 0.001 0.019 -0.071 0.052 
Inflation differential China vs. U.S. -0.010 0.022 -0.045 0.046 
Productivity differential China vs. U.S. (Δ) 0.004 0.007 -0.017 0.022 
Interest rate differential China vs. U.S. -0.014 0.018 -0.046 0.016 
Foreign exchange reserves growth 0.021 0.016 -0.041 0.063 
Export growth 0.014 0.119 -0.420 0.362 
Domestic credit to GDP (Δ) 0.002 0.032 -0.079 0.132 
EMBI sovereign bond yield 0.054 0.012 0.033 0.079 
Yuan/USD forward premium -0.011 0.042 -0.098 0.113 
ADR panel     
ADR discount -0.408 0.261 -0.937 0.326 
Relative trading volume  0.014 0.030 0.001 0.355 
Market capitalization 122.851 307.168 0.887 2925.930 
Return differential China vs. U.S. 0.009 0.094 -0.279 0.259 
Relative company P/E ratio (in logs) 0.318 0.898 -1.246 4.477 
Relative market P/E ratio 1.381 0.443 0.688 2.775 
Relative company P/CF ratio (in logs) 0.163 0.598 -1.338 3.171 
Relative market P/CF ratio 1.240 0.430 0.573 2.170 
Relative company P/B ratio (in logs) 0.004 0.319 -0.959 0.985 
Relative market P/B ratio 0.966 0.337 0.549 2.216 
H-share panel     
H-share discount -0.479 0.280 -0.954 0.386 
Relative trading volume  0.029 0.047 0.001 0.789 
Market capitalization 67.350 235.185 0.661 2925.930 
Return differential China vs. HK 0.008 0.088 -0.250 0.274 
Relative company P/E ratio (in logs) 0.344 0.798 -1.543 4.477 
Relative market P/E ratio 1.890 0.600 0.891 3.366 
Relative company P/CF ratio (in logs) 0.413 0.717 -1.338 3.584 
Relative market P/CF ratio 1.163 0.393 0.570 2.222 
Relative company P/B ratio (in logs) -0.015 0.437 -1.411 2.012 
Relative market P/B ratio 1.774 0.428 0.942 2.536 
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Table II.A3: Results of the panel unit root tests 
 ADR panel H-share panel 
 IPS t-statistic MW-Chi2 IPS t-statistic MW-Chi2 
ADR discount/H-share discount  -2.449 *** 56.448 ** -3.493 *** 149.602 *** 
          
Real overvaluation of yuan 1.819  31.345  -0.154  94.824  
  (-14.494) *** (321.096) *** (-23.571) *** (834.555) *** 
Inflation differential China vs. U.S. -3.339 *** 118.410 *** -8.656 *** 400.317 *** 
          
Productivity differential China vs. U.S. 3.675  33.814  6.859  67.485  
  (-1.424) * (56.768) * (-2.255) ** (63.873) ** 
Interest rate differential China vs. U.S. -0.839  53.017  -4.151 *** 162.411 *** 
  (-9.632) *** (204.297) ***     
Foreign exchange reserves growth -6.461 *** 170.923 *** -15.284 *** 619.933 *** 
          
Export growth -11.101 *** 247.946 *** -10.994 *** 425.348 *** 
          
Domestic credit to GDP -1.253  58.240 * 96.895  53.918  
  (-11.826) *** (245.045) *** (-13.497) *** (438.722) *** 
EMBI sovereign bond yield -2.251 ** 62.766 ** -5.424 *** 211.045 *** 
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Yuan/USD forward premium -2.833 *** 88.899 *** -5.934 *** 260.233 *** 
         
Relative trading volume A-share vs.  -14.771 *** 252.691 *** -15.290 *** 594.103 *** 
 ADR/H-share         
Return differential China vs. U.S./HK -15.251 *** 327.303 *** -17.653 *** 666.317 *** 
          
Market capitalization -3.383 *** 89.223 *** -4.339 *** 179.816 *** 
          
Relative company P/CF ratio -1.741 ** 55.780  -3.685 *** 168.976 *** 
          
Relative market P/CF ratio -2.299 ** 62.958 ** -3.369 *** 179.510 *** 
         
Relative company P/B ratio -2.999 *** 81.933 *** -3.551 *** 172.461 *** 
          
Relative market P/B ratio -4.061 *** 94.211 *** -2.390 *** 153.473 *** 
         
Relative company P/E ratio -2.177 ** 67.579 ** -2.794 *** 167.151 *** 
          
Relative market P/E ratio -2.112 ** 61.016 ** -2.368 *** 113.538 ** 
Note: This table presents the panel unit root test statistics of Im et al. (2003) (the IPS average t-statistic) and of Maddala and Wu (1999) (the 
MW Chi2 distributed average p-value) for the respective variable in levels and in first differences (in parentheses). Under the null hypothesis 
of each test the variable contains a unit root in levels.  *, **, and *** denotes that the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected in favor of 














We develop an indicator for currency crisis risk using price spreads between American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) and their underlying stocks. This measure signals the mean 
exchange rate ADR investors expect after a potential currency crisis or realignment. It makes 
crisis prediction possible on a daily basis as depreciation expectations are reflected in ADR 
market prices. Using daily data for the capital control episodes in Argentina (2001-2002), 
Malaysia (1998-1999), and Venezuela (1994-1996 and 2003-2007), we analyze the impact of 
several risk drivers related to currency crisis theories on depreciation expectations. We find 
that ADR investors perceive higher currency crisis risk when export commodity prices fall, 






                                                 
40 This paper is based on Eichler, S., Karmann, A., Maltritz, D., 2009. The ADR shadow exchange rate as an 
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This paper uses American Depositary Receipt (ADR) market data to measure and explain 
currency crisis expectations on a daily basis. After the introduction of capital controls, price 
spreads can develop between U.S. dollar-denominated ADRs and their local currency-
denominated underlying stocks in the emerging market. These price spreads are considered as 
a high-frequency indicator of currency crisis risk. We use these market price data to calculate 
the ADR shadow exchange rate, i.e. the mean exchange rate ADR investors expect after a 
potential currency crisis or realignment. Using daily data we study the capital control 
episodes in Argentina (2001-2002), Malaysia (1998-1999), and Venezuela (1994-1996 and 
2003-2007). We find that the ADR shadow exchange rate exceeds the pegged rate well 
before a currency crisis or realignment actually occurs, indicating that ADR investors 
correctly anticipate these events.  
In order to explain the magnitude of depreciation expectations, we use the ADR 
spread, which measures the percentage premium of the ADR shadow exchange rate over the 
official exchange rate. Within panel regressions, we analyze which currency crisis risk 
drivers ADR investors use to make their pricing decisions, which then determine the level of 
the ADR spread. In the literature, low-frequency data are often used to verify theoretical 
hypotheses concerning the occurrence of currency crises. As we focus on a highly frequent 
currency crisis measure based on stock market quotes, we are able to identify the observable 
variables that drive currency crisis risk on a daily basis as measured by the ADR spread. This 
enables us to analyze the impact of five risk drivers that are closely related to theories 
regarding the occurrence of currency crises using daily data: the link between commodity 
prices and currency crisis risk, the temptation of competitive devaluations, the risk of twin 
debt and currency crises, the risk of twin banking and currency crises, and the accuracy of 
uncovered interest rate parity to signal a devaluation. We find that falling export commodity 
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prices, depreciating export partners’ currencies, rising sovereign yield spreads, and rising 
interest rate spreads increase the risk of a currency crisis – as indicated by rising ADR 
spreads. This provides evidence that ADR investors take information about the sustainability 
of a peg as signaled by other segments of the financial market into account when modifying 
their depreciation expectations.    
Having identified the risk drivers that determine the magnitude of devaluation ADR 
investors expect, we study whether there are regime switches in the process of determination 
of currency crisis expectations by applying the regime switching methodology of Bai et al. 
(1998).
41
 For the capital control episodes in Malaysia (1998-1999) and Venezuela (2003-
2007), we find a switch from a relatively tranquil peg regime to a vulnerable peg regime as 
the correlation between the ADR spread and the risk drivers increased significantly. For 
Argentina, we find that shortly after the breakdown of the peg, devaluation expectations 
became much less responsive to the risk drivers of other markets. For Venezuela (1994-1996) 
we find no significant regime switch. 
The most important branches of literature dealing with the prediction of currency 
crises are based either on logit/probit models (see, for example, Eichengreen et al., 1995; 
Frankel and Rose, 1996; Karmann et al., 2002) or on the signals approach (see, for example, 
Kaminsky et al., 1998; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
42
 Recently, some authors have applied 
Markov switching methodology to develop early warning systems for currency crises (see, 
for example, Kittelmann et al., 2006; Alvarez-Plata and Schrooten, 2006). These prediction 
models use macroeconomic variables and show that a deterioration of macroeconomic 
fundamentals can lead to currency crises. This literature not only provides useful insight into 
the nature and causes of currency crises but also shows that crisis prediction is possible at all.  
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 Kallberg et al. (2005) and Pasquariello (2008), for example, use this methodology to determine regime breaks 
in stock pricing induced by financial crises. 
42
 Edison (2003), Berg et al. (2005), and Beckmann et al. (2006) review the forecasting performance of different 
types of early warning systems.  
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As market data obviously exhibits some advantages over macroeconomic data, such 
as high frequency and a forward-looking nature, we contribute to the literature by using ADR 
market data as an early warning indicator for currency crises. This adds to the literature that 
uses market-based approaches to forecast other types of financial crises such as banking and 
sovereign debt crises. While some papers forecast the occurrence of banking crises using 
macroeconomic data (see, for example, Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998), recent 
papers use market information to predict banking distress (see, for example, Gropp et al., 
2006; Moshirian and Wu, 2009; Eichler et al., 2010, 2011). To forecast sovereign debt crises, 
some papers use economic fundamentals (see, for example, Detragiache and Spilimbergo, 
2004) while others apply market data to estimate country default risk (see, for example, 
Claessens and Pennacchi, 1996; Karmann, 2000; Karmann and Maltritz, 2004, 2010; 
Huschens et al. 2007).   
Our paper contributes to a literature that studies the impact of financial crises on ADR 
pricing. A common finding is that the returns on U.S. dollar-denominated ADRs are 
negatively affected by currency crises as the devaluation of the local currency depresses the 
dollar value of the underlying stock (see, for example, Bailey et al., 2000; Kim et al., 2000; 
Bin et al., 2004). Pasquariello (2008) finds that the outbreak of a financial crisis typically 
leads to a disintegration of the local capital market measured by a persistent violation of the 
law of one price between an ADR and its underlying stock.
43
 Another branch of the literature 
studies how the introduction of capital controls in the home market affects ADR pricing. In 
general, the ADR and its corresponding underlying stock have the same exchange rate 
adjusted price since both types of stocks generate identical streams of cash flows and 
incorporate equivalent rights and dividend claims. Several authors find, however, that the 
introduction of capital controls can lead to a permanent violation of the law of one price 
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 Chandar et al. (2009) find that stocks of cross-listed companies exhibit higher average returns than stocks of 
non-cross-listed companies, particularly after the outbreak of financial crises. 
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between ADRs and their underlying stocks since cross-border arbitrage cannot take place 
(Melvin, 2003; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004; Auguste et al., 2006).
44
 Arquette et al. (2008) 
analyze the price spreads between Chinese underlying stocks and their corresponding ADRs 
(or Hong Kong H-shares). They find that exchange rate expectations – extracted from 
forward exchange rates – explain 40% of the variation in the ADR price spread. The literature 
thus far has concluded that capital controls can lead to a violation of the law of one price, that 
financial crises influence the relative pricing of ADRs and their underlying stocks, and that 
the price spread is correlated with market-traded forward exchange rates.  
We contribute to this literature in several ways. First, we quantify ADR shadow 
exchange rates, which can be used as early warning indicators for currency crises on a daily 
basis. Second, we explain ADR investors’ devaluation expectations, as reflected in the ADR 
spreads, within a panel regression framework using market-based risk drivers that are related 
to theories that explain the occurrence of currency crises. Third, we date regime switches in 
the process of determination of currency crisis expectations, thereby deriving evidence for an 
endogenous change in ADR investors’ assessment of the sustainability of the currency peg.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section III.2 describes how 
depreciation expectations are derived from ADR market data. Section III.3 applies this 
approach to four capital control episodes. Section III.4 discusses the risk drivers used to 
explain ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations. Section III.5 tests the hypotheses of 
Section III.4 and searches for regime breaks in the process of determination of currency crisis 
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 Levy Yeyati et al. (2009) confirm this view finding that controls on capital outflows (inflows) lead to 
persistent price premiums (discounts) of the underlying stock over the ADR. 
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III.2 Measuring currency crisis expectations using ADR market data 
The following presents a formal representation of the price relation between ADRs and their 
underlying stocks in the emerging market and how this information can signal a currency 
crisis. An ADR represents the ownership of a specific number of underlying shares in the 
home market on which the ADR is written.45 While the ADR is traded at a U.S. stock 
exchange and is denominated in U.S. dollars, the underlying stock is denominated in the 
local currency and traded at the stock exchange of the home (emerging) market. The 
starting point of our discussion is ADR conversion. ADR conversion means that one ADR, 
traded in the United States and quoted in U.S. dollars at price ADRitp , can be converted into i  
shares of the underlying stock, traded in the emerging market and quoted in the emerging 
market’s currency at price EMitp . The variable i  is called the conversion ratio and is specific 
to the ADR of each company, i .
46
  
Since ADR conversion can be conducted at any point in time and both types of stocks 
of the same firm generate identical streams of cash flows and incorporate equivalent rights 
and dividend claims, the ADR and its corresponding underlying stock are perfect substitutes. 
Thus, assuming perfect capital markets, both types of stocks should exhibit the same price 
after applying the current official exchange rate, tS
47
. In the absence of capital controls, 









 .                                  (III.1) 
As long as the government of the emerging market fixes its exchange rate to the U.S. dollar at 
the peg rate 
*S , the arbitrage consistent ADR pricing Eq. (III.1) can be rewritten as: 
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 See Karolyi (1998) for an excellent survey on the ADR market. 
46
 Conversely, one emerging market stock can be converted into i/ 1  ADRs.        
47










 .                                      (III.2) 
Since arbitrage forces guarantee that both types of stocks are worth the same, an investor is 
indifferent as to where to allocate his capital. Eqs. (III.1) and (III.2) are, however, only 
binding as long as ADR arbitrage is possible and cross-border capital flows are not being 
restricted.  
The imposition of capital controls can result in a permanent violation of the arbitrage 
consistent pricing Eqs. (III.1) and (III.2). Because financial proceeds cannot be transferred 
across borders and, thus, ADR arbitrage is no longer possible, discrepancies between the 
price of the ADR and the price of its underlying stock can occur and persist over time. If 
ADR investors anticipate a devaluation of the emerging market currency against the U.S. 
dollar, the price relation between the ADR and its underlying stock should incorporate an 
expected exchange rate, expitS , that is higher than the current peg rate, 
*S ; that is, expitS
*S .48 










 .                                                     (III.3) 
In times of capital controls and in the presence of currency crisis expectations, the price of 
the emerging market stock seems to be overvalued since it is higher than the right-hand side 
of the arbitrage condition (III.2) suggests,     iADRitiexpitADRit SpSp  * .49 This speculation-
consistent pricing Eq. (III.3) is reasonable in the context of information efficiency as all 
public information concerning the sustainability of the peg is reflected in the ADR shadow 
                                                 
48
 In principle, investors could also expect an appreciation of the domestic currency, i.e. 
exp
itS
*S . However, 
in our dataset comprised of currency crisis episodes, the case of appreciation expectations is irrelevant.  
49
 In the case of the Argentine crisis (2001-2002), Melvin (2003), Levy Yeyati et al. (2004) and Auguste et al. 
(2006) observe exploding premiums of Argentine underlying stocks over their ADRs of 40-45% prior to the 
devaluation of the Argentine peso on January 11, 2002. 
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exchange rate, expitS . The shadow exchange rate will change as soon as the market receives 
new information about the peg’s credibility.50 Rearranging Eq. (III.3), we can figure out the 











exp .                                       (III.4) 
This ADR shadow exchange rate represents the mean exchange rate expected by ADR 
market participants. Rising (falling) values of expitS  point to an increasing (decreasing) risk of 
a currency crisis. ADR investors reveal their “true” assessment of a reasonable exchange rate 
because as soon as capital controls are lifted, ADR arbitrage will resume, the price relation 
between the ADR and the emerging market stock will be determined by Eq. (III.1) again, and 
the official exchange rate will apply. Thus, “false” expectations (incorporated in the price 
relation between ADRs and underlying stocks) would penalize either shareholders of the 
ADR or of the underlying stock and should therefore be speculated away. 
 Although the shadow exchange rate is an intuitive instrument to measure devaluation 
expectations, we use the ADR spread as the dependent variable in the empirical analysis in 
Section III.5. The ADR spread, itY , is calculated as the percentage premium of the ADR 







 .                                 (III.5)    
The ADR spread measures the expected amount of domestic currency devaluation against the 
U.S dollar. The ADR spread has the advantage that it accounts for possible realignments. If 
the government realigns the official peg rate by a certain percentage, expectations of a further 
                                                 
50
 Again, note that the price deviation shown in Eq. (III.3) and its corresponding implications only hold true if 
capital controls are installed and, thus, cross-border arbitrage cannot take place. 
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devaluation – as measured by the ADR spread – should fall by the same amount. To capture 
this effect of realignments, we use the ADR spread in Section 5 to explain devaluation 
expectations within a regression framework.
51
  
 The reflection of currency crisis expectations through ADR data can be summarized as 
follows: following the introduction of capital controls (typically meant to avoid the outbreak 
of a currency crisis), the price of the emerging market stock typically exceeds the exchange 
rate-adjusted price of the ADR, indicating that ADR investors anticipate a devaluation of the 
emerging market currency against the U.S. dollar. We calculate the ADR shadow exchange 
rate and the ADR spread from the price ratio of both types of stocks. Both measures reflect 
the ADR investors’ assessment of the peg’s sustainability. While rising values of the ADR 
shadow exchange rate and the ADR spread point to a higher currency crisis risk, falling 
values signal a lower risk of a currency crisis. 
 
III.3 ADR spread and shadow exchange rate in times of currency crisis  
In this section we discuss the development of the ADR shadow exchange rate and ADR 
spread during the following four capital control regimes: Argentina (December 3, 2001 to 
November 29, 2002), Malaysia (September 1, 1998 to August 31, 1999), Venezuela (June 28, 
1994 to April 19, 1996), and Venezuela (February 7, 2003 to May 11, 2007). These capital 
control regimes effectively prevented cross-border capital flows, which enables us to study 
                                                 
51
 Our considerations build on the assumption of perfect capital markets. In reality, however, some aspects of 
the ADR market such as transaction costs, bid-ask spreads or infrequent trading contradict this assumption. 
These frictions can lead to market-specific no-arbitrage bands within which arbitrage strategies, aimed at 
exploiting price spreads between ADRs and their underlying stocks, do not pay off. These market frictions 
should have only a minor impact on our results. First, our analysis relies on exploiting the variation in the ADR 
spread over time and across companies within a country. As market frictions should not change much over time, 
they should, thus, be captured by the constant in the regressions. Second, our data reveals that the departure 
from the law of one price is very small during periods of free capital movements. Moreover, for a large set of 
emerging economies, Levy Yeyati et al. (2009) find that these no-arbitrage bands are generally narrow and that 
price spreads outside these bands are arbitraged away very quickly. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that 
market frictions only play a minor role in determining the ADR spreads during capital controls as well. 
Accordingly, the majority of the variation in the ADR spread and the ADR shadow exchange rate can be 
attributed to changes in depreciation expectations.  
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price deviations between ADRs and their underlying stocks.
52
 For each capital control 
episode, we calculate the ADR shadow exchange rate according to Eq. (III.4), whereby in this 




Our empirical analysis is based on data for 17 ADR/underlying stock pairs. A list of 
included stocks is included in Table III.A1 in Appendix III.
54
 Figures III.1 to III.4 illustrate 
the ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate during the considered capital 
control periods. We also depict these values during two months before the introduction and 
following the lifting of capital controls in order to show the ADR pricing mechanism under 
free capital movements. The spreads between the ADR shadow exchange rate and the official 
exchange rate during periods without capital controls are quite small in each country, 
suggesting that market frictions play a minor role in our context.      
Figure III.1 displays the ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate 
during the period of capital controls in Argentina. The Argentine capital controls, corralito, 
were in place from December 3, 2001 to November 29, 2002 and were meant to rescue the 
currency board, which guaranteed a fixed exchange rate of 1 Argentine peso (ARS)/U.S. 
dollar (USD).
 55
 The currency board collapsed on January 11, 2002, but capital controls were 
not lifted until December 2, 2002. The abandoning of the currency board and a depreciation 
of the peso to 1.4 ARS/USD on January 11, 2002 was fairly expected by ADR investors who 
set the ADR shadow exchange rate at around 1.5 ARS/USD in the week preceding the 
devaluation. Thus, the ADR spread of 50% fairly accurately anticipated the actual 
                                                 
52
 Of course, there may have occurred illegal cross-border capital flows during these capital control episodes 
such as through trade misinvoicing or other types of illegal cross-border transactions. However, arbitrage in the 
ADR market is typically done by stock market investors which are presumably less likely to engage in outright 
illegal economic transactions. 
53
 In the panel regression analysis in Section III.5 we use company-specific ADR spreads. 
54
 Information on ADRs is taken from the internet databases of JP Morgan (www.adr.com) and Bank of 
America (www.adrbny.com). Data on stock prices are taken from Datastream.    
55
 See Stiglitz (2002) and de la Torre et al. (2003) for the timeline and causes of the Argentine crisis. 
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devaluation of 40%. Until the lifting of capital controls, the ADR shadow exchange rate 
remained mostly above the official exchange rate, resulting in positive ADR spreads and 
indicating that ADR investors expected the peso to depreciate even further.  
 
Figure III.1: ADR shadow exchange rate and official exchange rate Argentina (2001-2002)  
 
Note: This figure shows the ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate for Argentina during the 
capital control period from December 3, 2001 thru November 29, 2002. On January 11, 2002 the Argentine 
currency board collapsed. The ADR shadow exchange rate is calculated according to Eq. (III.4).  
 
In contrast to Argentina, where the corralito’s purpose was to save the existing peso currency 
board, Malaysian capital controls (implemented from September 1, 1998 to August 31, 1999) 
were introduced at the same time as the flexible exchange rate regime was abandoned and a 
fixed exchange rate of 3.8 ringgit (MYR)/USD was adopted (see Ariyoshi et al., 2000, for 
details). The Malaysian ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate are 
displayed in Figure III.2. At the peak of the Southeast Asian crisis, the Malaysian 
government decided on September 1, 1998 to stop the steady depreciation of the ringgit by 
introducing capital controls and pegging the ringgit vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar. Shortly after the 


































































































































































ADR shadow  exchange rate Official exchange rate
 III.12 
in the ADR shadow exchange rate from 3.8 MYR/USD to 5.5 MYR/USD, equal to an ADR 
spread of about 45%. Apparently, ADR market participants considered the new peg 
unsustainable in a situation where the prices of Malaysia’s main export commodities (such as 
palm and crude oil) fell, the Asian financial crisis had not yet been resolved, and Russia 
experienced the outbreak of a currency crisis. After macroeconomic conditions improved and 
the currencies of Malaysia’s trading partners appreciated against the U.S. dollar, the new peg 
regime became more stable and the ADR shadow exchange rate steadily converged to the peg 
rate in 1999.     
 
Figure III.2: ADR shadow exchange rate and official exchange rate Malaysia (1998-1999)  
 
Note: This figure shows the ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate for Malaysia during the 
capital control period from September 1, 1998 thru August 31, 1999. The ADR shadow exchange rate is 
calculated according to Eq. (III.4).  
 
Venezuela introduced capital controls on June 28, 1994 and abandoned its crawling peg, 
replacing it with a fixed exchange rate of 170 bolivar (VEB)/USD (for details, see Ariyoshi et 
































































































































































ADR shadow  exchange rate Official exchange rate
 III.13 
(1994-1996) are displayed in Figure III.3. In an effort to cope with a banking crisis, the 
Venezuelan central bank recapitalized troubled banks, thereby increasing both the money 
supply and inflationary pressure. This led to rising devaluation expectations reflected by an 
increasing ADR shadow exchange rate. ADR investors anticipated the realignment of the 
fixed exchange rate from 170 VEB/USD to 290 VEB/USD on December 12, 1995 as the 
ADR shadow exchange rate reached values of approximately 250 VEB/USD one week before 
the realignment. On April 22, 1996, the capital controls were lifted. The bolivar was allowed 
to float, and it depreciated to around 500 VEB/USD. This currency crisis – associated with a 
72% devaluation – was also expected by ADR investors who set the ADR shadow exchange 
rate at 494 VEB/USD one week before, equal to an ADR spread of about 70%. 
 
Figure III.3: ADR shadow exchange rate and official exchange rate Venezuela (1994-1996)  
 
Note: This figure shows the ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate for Venezuela during the 
capital control period from June 28, 1994 thru April 19, 1996. On December 12, 1995 the exchange rate was 
realigned from 170 bolivar/dollar to 290 bolivar/dollar. On April 22, 1996, the peg collapsed. The ADR shadow 
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After a period of floating exchange rates and absent capital controls, the Venezuelan 
government reintroduced capital controls on February 7, 2003 and pegged the exchange rate 
at 1,600 VEB/USD. The ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate for the 
more recent Venezuelan capital controls are displayed in Figure III.4.
56
 Interruptions in oil 
production due to strikes stalled exports and diminished currency reserves thereby raising 
devaluation expectations, indicated by rising ADR shadow exchange rates. Two realignments 
took place to soften the real appreciation of the bolivar induced by high inflation in 
Venezuela: on February 9, 2004 to 1,920 VEB/USD and on March 1, 2005 to 2,150 
VEB/USD. Both realignments were fairly anticipated by a rising ADR shadow exchange rate 
although the exchange rate forecasts are far less accurate than in the cases of Argentina and 
Venezuela (1994-1996).   
 
Figure III.4: ADR shadow exchange rate and official exchange rate Venezuela (2003-2007)  
 
Note: This figure shows the ADR shadow exchange rate and the official exchange rate for Venezuela during the 
capital control period from February 7, 2003 thru May 11, 2007. On February 9, 2004 the exchange rate was 
                                                 
56
 The sample is truncated to May 11, 2007, the day the only recently trading Venezuelan ADR (Compañía 
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realigned to 1,920 bolivar/dollar. On March 1, 2005 it was realigned to 2,150 bolivar/dollar. The ADR shadow 
exchange rate is calculated according to Eq. (III.4).  
 
III.4 Currency crisis-related variables that drive the ADR spread 
In this section we identify five variables that supposedly drive currency crisis expectations of 
ADR investors. Based on currency crisis theory, we first examine potential determinants of 
currency crisis risk. We then explain how these determinants can be measured empirically. 
Each of these five determinants can be measured on a daily basis and reflects – according to 
the theories described below – a separate issue concerning the peg’s sustainability.   
 
III.4.1 Discussion of hypotheses  
First, we focus on the relation between commodity prices and exchange rates. For each of the 
considered countries, commodities exports account for a considerable share of total exports.
57
 
Cashin et al. (2004) and Zalduendo (2006), for example, find evidence that increasing prices 
of a country’s export commodities are associated with an appreciation of the domestic 
currency. Rising prices of exported commodities lead, ceteris paribus, to increasing export 
revenues and rising inflows of foreign exchange, thereby increasing central bank reserves 
and, thus, decreasing the risk of a currency crisis. We therefore expect the prices of exported 
commodities to be negatively correlated with the ADR spread. 
The incentive for competitive devaluations may serve as another source of currency 
crisis risk. Glick and Rose (1999) show that, due to beggar-thy-neighbour exchange rate 
policies, currency crises tend to spread regionally. If the home currency is pegged to the U.S. 
dollar, a depreciation of the export destination countries’ currencies against the U.S. dollar 
will lead to an appreciation of the home currency against the export destination countries’ 
currencies. An appreciation of the home currency deteriorates the competitiveness of 
                                                 
57
 See Table III.A2 in Appendix III. 
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domestic exporters, resulting in lower export revenues and thereby negatively affecting the 
central bank’s foreign exchange reserves and increasing the risk of a currency crisis. Thus, 
we expect a depreciation of the export destination countries’ currencies against the U.S. 
dollar to be positively correlated with the ADR spread.  
Currency and sovereign debt crises often occur together. Several empirical studies 
confirm the incidence of this twin crisis (Dreher et al., 2006; Herz and Tong, 2008). To 
capture the dependency of both types of crises, many theoretical approaches apply a second-
generation currency crisis framework where the government weights the benefits/costs of 
devaluating the currency and defaulting on sovereign debt (Bauer et al., 2003; Benigno and 
Missale, 2004). A general result of these models is that a twin sovereign debt and currency 
crisis is more probable for countries with overindebted governments. As both types of crises 
are interrelated, we expect sovereign debt crisis indicators, such as sovereign yield spreads, to 
be indicators for currency crises as well. We expect that higher sovereign yield spreads 
(which reflect a higher risk of a sovereign debt crisis) will lead to higher ADR spreads 
(because sovereign debt and currency crises often go hand in hand). 
Interest rate spreads for bank deposits or interbank funds represent another indicator 
for currency crisis risk. Let us suppose Argentine
58
 banks offer an interest rate of PesoARGi  for 
peso deposits and USDARGi  for U.S. dollar deposits. Uncovered interest rate parity requires that 
the interest rate spread compensates investors for the expected peso depreciation against the 
U.S. dollar, i.e.   **expUSDARGPesoARG SSSii  .59 A higher currency crisis risk in Argentina 
should lead to a larger interest rate spread, USDARG
Peso
ARG ii  . We therefore expect a positive 
correlation between this currency crisis-related interest rate spread and the ADR spread. 
                                                 
58
 This argument analogously applies to the cases of Malaysia and Venezuela.   
59
 
expS  denotes the exchange rate expected by money market investors. *S  denotes the current official 
exchange rate. As both interest rates are offered by the same bank or banking system, the risk of a banking crisis 
or bank default does not affect this interest rate spread. 
 III.17 
The joint occurrence of currency and banking crises is intensively discussed in the 
literature. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) present empirical evidence for the incidence of this 
twin crisis. A banking crisis may force the central bank – acting as a lender of last resort – to 
bail out troubled banks by printing money which, in turn, produces inflationary pressure that 
can lead to a currency crisis (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Velasco, 1987; Calvo, 1998; Miller, 
2000). Thus, the connection between the risk of a banking crisis and the risk of a currency 
crisis justifies the inclusion of a banking crisis indicator in our analysis. To measure the risk 
of a banking crisis, we use the spreads between interest rates on proceeds denominated in the 
same currency but offered by banks of different countries. For example, the spread between 
the interest rate on U.S. dollar deposits offered by Argentine banks, USDARGi , and the interest rate 
on U.S. dollar deposits offered by U.S. banks, USDSUi .. ,  signals the relative risk that Argentine 
banks will default. The higher the risk of a banking crisis in Argentina, the higher the interest 
rate spread USDSU
USD
ARG ii .. .
60
 According to these considerations, the risk measure of a currency 
crisis (the ADR spread) should increase whenever the risk measure of a banking crisis (the 
interest rate spread USDSU
USD
ARG ii .. ) increases.  
 
III.4.2 Empirical identification of the currency crisis risk drivers  
To study the impact of price changes of the export commodities on the ADR spread, we 
construct country-specific value-weighted commodity price indices. We calculate the 
commodity price index as a chain-linked index for each capital control episode i  on day t , 
i
tCP : 
       ititi Tti Ttit IIIICP   1111 11 ... ,                                (III.6) 
                                                 
60
 Exchange rate risk does not affect this interest rate spread, as both interest rates relate to the same currency. 
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where the percentage change of the commodity price index from day 1t  to day t  is given 
























,                                 (III.7) 
where tjp ,  is the U.S. dollar price of commodity j  and 
i
jw  represents the export share of 
commodity j  in i ’s total (considered) commodity exports. The country-specific commodity 
export weights are compiled from various IMF Staff Country Reports and domestic statistical 
sources and are reported in Table III.A2 in Appendix III. Data on commodity prices are 
largely drawn from the Dow Jones-AIG Commodity Sub-Indices.
61
 A higher commodity 
price index indicates higher prices of a country’s exported commodities. 
The effect of an appreciation of the domestic currency relative to the currencies of the 
export destination countries on the ADR spread is also analyzed by using country-specific 
indices. Similar to the case of the commodity price index, the export destination exchange 
rate index for each capital control episode i  on day t , itEER , is a chain-linked index 
       ititi Tti Ttit II...IIEER   1111 11 ,                      (III.8) 
 where the percentage change of i ’s EER index from day 1t  to day t  is given by itI . 
i
tI  is 

























,                              (III.9) 
where t,je  is the bilateral dollar exchange rate of the 20 largest export trading partners j  – 
measured as the amount of currency units of i ’s export trading partner j  per U.S. dollar – 
                                                 
61
 For the Malaysian export commodities palm oil and rubber, we use prices from the Kuala Lumpur 
Commodity Exchange because no Dow Jones Sub-Index is available for these commodities. 
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and ijw  represents the share of i ’s exports to j  relative to i ’s total exports to the 20 trading 
partners. The country-specific export shares reported in Table III.A3 in Appendix III are 
computed using the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade Statistics.62 A rising 
exchange rate index indicates and appreciation of a country’s currency against the currencies 
of the export destination countries. The commodity price and exchange rate indices are used 
in natural logs. 
In order to measure sovereign default risk we use sovereign bond yield spreads for 
each country taken from the JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index (EMBI) Global. 
The spread is calculated as the difference between the redemption yield on domestic U.S. 
dollar denominated sovereign bonds and the redemption yield of U.S. sovereign bonds. The 
EMBI spreads are averaged spreads of the most liquid Brady and Eurobond issues of the 
respective country and are widely used in the literature on sovereign debt crises. Higher 
EMBI sovereign yield spreads indicate a higher sovereign default risk. 
Interest rate spreads that signal the risk of a currency crisis or a banking crisis 
separately are only available for Argentina (2001-2002) and Malaysia (1998-1999).
63
 In order 
to measure currency crisis expectations formed on the money market, we use deposit interest 
rates for Argentina and the Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered Rate for Malaysia. For both 
countries, the domestic banking system offers interest rates for funds in domestic currency 
(pesos or ringgits), PesoARGi , and in U.S. dollars, 
USD
ARGi , enabling us to calculate the currency 
crisis proxy USDARG
Peso
ARG ii  .
64
 According to uncovered interest rate parity, a rising interest rate 
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 Exports to the U.S. are not included in the index which shows relative changes in the U.S. dollar exchange 
rates of a country’s trading partners. 
63
 Data on interest rates on U.S. dollar-denominated funds offered by Venezuelan banks are not available. 
64
 Both interest rates differ only with respect to the currency denomination of the funds the interest is paid on. 
Both interest rates are offered by domestic banks. Thus, the interest rate spread does not respond to banking 




ARG ii   indicates higher depreciation expectations of the peso (or ringgit) against 
the U.S. dollar.  
To compute the banking crisis risk proxy USDSU
USD
ARG ii .. , we use the interest rate for 
certificates of deposit offered by U.S. banks for dollar funds in order to identify USDSUi .. .
65
 A 
rising interest rate spread USDSU
USD
ARG ii ..  indicates higher banking crisis risk for Argentina (or 
Malaysia). 
For the Venezuelan capital control episodes, no data on interest rates on U.S. dollar 
denominated funds offered by Venezuelan banks are available. We therefore include the 
“raw” spread between the Venezuelan interest rate for bolivar deposits and the U.S. 
certificates of deposit rate to compute a crude measure that accounts for both the currency 
crisis and the banking crisis risk. Data is taken from Datastream. To eliminate term structure 
effects, we only use interest rates with a maturity of one month. 
 
III.5 Empirical analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses explained in Section III.4, we regress the ADR spread – 
assumed to be an indicator for currency crisis expectations – on the five market-based risk 
drivers. We use two types of models. The first model employs a panel framework to explain 
the determination of the currency crisis expectations contained in the ADR spread for a set of 
ADR stock pairs over time. The second model applies the time series framework proposed by 
Bai et al. (1998) in order to test whether there are regime switches in ADR investors’ 
currency crisis expectation-making process during episodes of capital controls.  
Each model is estimated using daily data. We favor daily data as the episodes of 
capital controls studied were rather short. In addition, we want to test whether ADR 
                                                 
65
 The U.S. dollar interest rates offered by Argentine and Malaysian banks are the same rates as employed for 
the currency crisis proxy, i.e. deposit rates for the case of Argentina and Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered Rates 
for Malaysia. 
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investors’ currency crisis expectations react to new information reflected in the risk drivers 
even on such a high data frequency.
66
 In addition to the five currency crisis risk drivers 
discussed in Section III.4, we use six control variables.
67
 First, we include four variables to 
control for investor sentiments. Several papers find that changes in investor sentiments are 
significant drivers of the price spread between ADRs and their underlying stocks (Kim et al., 
2000; Wang and Jiang, 2004; Arquette et al., 2008; Burdekin and Redfern, 2009). To control 
for investor sentiments, we use the variables proposed by Arquette et al. (2008). Investor 
sentiment towards the local stock market versus the U.S. stock market is measured by the 
relative market price-earnings (P/E) ratio, which is calculated by dividing the P/E ratio of the 
local stock market by the P/E ratio of the U.S. stock market. Investor sentiment towards an 
individual company is measured by the relative company P/E ratio, which is calculated by 
dividing the local stock’s P/E ratio by the P/E ratio of the local stock market as a whole. As 
alternative measures of investor sentiments, we include the relative market dividend yield 
(DY) ratio and the relative company DY ratio to check the robustness of our results. Both 
variables have a similar interpretation as the sentiment variables based on the P/E ratio 
explained above. The relative market DY ratio is calculated by dividing the DY of the local 
stock market by the DY of the U.S. stock market.
68
 The relative company DY ratio is 
computed by dividing the company’s DY by the DY of the local stock market. We expect 
higher relative market and company P/E and DY ratios to be associated with higher ADR 
spreads, ceteris paribus, as more positive investor sentiments increase the relative price 
investors are willing to pay for the local stock.  
                                                 
66
 There are, of course, some shortcomings of daily data, such as short term noise and high volatility (see, for 
example, Kallberg et al., 2005; Arquette et al., 2008). As a robustness check, we have estimated each model 
using weekly data to address these problems but found only minor changes in the results.  
67
 The data on control variables are also taken from Datastream.   
68
 The P/E and DY ratios of the stock markets are taken from the country-specific Datastream Global Equity 
Index. 
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To control for company size, we include the firm’s market capitalization. In order to 
account for a possible tax bias, we include the annual dividend per share as different tax 
structures in the home country and the United States may have an impact on ADR pricing 
(see Arquette et al., 2008, p. 1924 for a detailed discussion).  
 
III.5.1 Panel analysis of the determinants of currency crisis expectations 
Within the panel regressions, we aim to explain the variation of the firm-specific ADR 
spreads across companies and over time by using data on currency crisis risk drivers and 
control variables. For each episode of capital controls for Argentina, Malaysia, and 
Venezuela (1994-1996)
69
 we estimate the fixed effects panel model
70





ktkit xxY    .                      (III.10)   
itY  denotes the ADR spread of company i  on day t ;   is a constant; ktx  denotes the k  
exogenous variables that do not vary across companies, i.e. the five potential risk drivers 
outlined in Section III.4 plus the relative market P/E ratio and the relative market DY ratio; 
jitx  represents the j  company-specific exogenous variables, i.e. the relative company P/E 
ratio, the relative company DY ratio, the market capitalization, and the dividend per share; 
k  and j  are the associated coefficients; i  is company-specific fixed effects; and it  is 
the error.  
The ADR spread is calculated as outlined in Eq. (III.5). The companies included for 
each episode of capital controls are listed in Table III.A1 in Appendix III. The levels of the 
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 The capital control episode for Venezuela (2003-2007) cannot be studied in a panel framework as data for 
only one company and its corresponding ADR is available for this case.   
70
 We use the Hausman (1978) specification test in order to determine whether or not a random effects model 
would be more appropriate than the applied fixed effects model. Under the null of the test the random and fixed 
effects coefficients are equal. The results of the Hausman test indicate that the random and fixed effects 
coefficients are significantly different, suggesting that the fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
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commodity price index, the export destination exchange rate index, and the market 
capitalization are used in logs. Before estimating the panel models, we check for unit roots in 
the variables using the panel unit root tests of Im et al. (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999).
71
 
Under the null of each test, the variable contains a unit root. Table III.A4 in Appendix III 
reports the results of the panel unit root tests. In the panel regressions, we include a variable 
in levels only if the null of a unit root is rejected at least at the 10% significance level by both 
tests. The Δ symbol in the results tables indicates that the variable is used in first differences.   
The panel estimation results for Argentina, Malaysia, and Venezuela (1994-1996) are 
displayed in Tables III.1, III.2, and III.3, respectively. For each capital control episode, we 
estimate four different specifications. Each specification includes the five risk drivers, the 
market capitalization, and the dividend per share. In specifications I and III, we use the 
relative company and market P/E ratios whereas for II and IV, we include the relative 
company and market DY ratios in order to control for investor sentiments. Specifications I 
and II report pooled estimations while specifications III and IV allow for company-specific 
fixed effects. In all panel estimations, the t-values are computed using robust standard errors 
clustered by company to control for possible heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the 
residuals for a company across time.    
Overall, the results of the panel estimations confirm the theoretical hypotheses. The 
coefficient of the commodity price index is significantly negative for all specifications of the 
Argentina and Malaysia regressions while for Venezuela (1994-1996) it is insignificant. In 
the case of Argentina, for example, a 1% fall in the commodity price index significantly 
increases depreciation expectations (measured by the ADR spread) by approximately 0.3% to 
0.5%, ceteris paribus. We thus find evidence that falling export commodity prices increase 
the risk of currency crisis outbreaks as expected by ADR investors. 
                                                 
71
 Chapter V provides a short overview of (panel) unit root tests.    
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Table III.1: Panel estimation results for Argentina  
Dependent variable: ADR spread I II III IV 
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Company-specific fixed effects  no no yes yes 
R-squared 0.150 0.181 0.202 0.258 
p-value F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 2340 2340 2340 2340 
Note: This table reports the results of the panel regressions (see Eq., III.10) for Argentina during the capital 
control episode from December 3, 2001 thru November 29, 2002. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed 






 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
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Table III.2: Panel estimation results for Malaysia  
Dependent variable: Δ ADR spread I II III IV 
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Company-specific fixed effects  no no yes yes 
R-squared 0.277 0.280 0.287 0.29 
p-value F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 783 783 783 783 
Note: This table reports the results of the panel regressions (see Eq., III.10) for Malaysia during the capital 
control episode from September 1, 1998 thru August 31, 1999. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed 






 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively.  
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      Table III.3: Panel estimation results for Venezuela (1994-1996)  
Dependent variable: Δ ADR spread I II III IV 




















EMBI sovereign yield spread (Δ) 



















Raw interest rate spread (Δ) 










































































Company-specific fixed effects  no no yes yes 
R-squared 0.153 0.152 0.154 0.153 
p-value F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 654 654 654 654 
Note: This table reports the results of the panel regressions (see Eq., III.10) for Venezuela during the capital 
control episode from June 28, 1994 thru April 19, 1996. The t-statistics in parentheses are computed based on 










The exchange rate index is significantly positive in all specifications for Argentina 
and Malaysia. ADR investors’ devaluation expectations increase when the domestic currency 
appreciates relative to the currencies of the country’s export trading partners. Competitive 
devaluations thus seem to be a relevant factor when explaining the perceived risk of a 
currency crisis. The strong incidence of this argument in Malaysia confirms the existence of 
the widely discussed beggar-thy-neighbor exchange rate policy in Southeast Asia.
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 For Venezuela (1994-1996), we find a significantly positive correlation between the 
EMBI sovereign yield spread and the ADR spread. A 1% increase in the sovereign yield 
spread – indicating a higher sovereign debt crisis risk – leads to a 2% increase in depreciation 
expectations for Venezuela. Thus, for Venezuela (1994-1996) we find empirical support for 
the hypothesis that sovereign debt and currency crises are interdependent. Apparently, ADR 
investors anticipate the risk that a sovereign default can lead to a currency crisis in 
Venezuela. For Argentina and Malaysia we find, however, no significant effect. 
The interest rate spread measuring currency crisis risk is significantly positive for all 
specifications for Malaysia while for Argentina, it is insignificant.
73
 That is, for the case of 
Malaysia rising depreciation expectations in the money market carry over to the ADR market. 
This finding supports the validity of uncovered interest rate parity during currency crises. 
Investors in vulnerable currencies receive higher domestic interest rates to compensate for the 
risk of devaluation.  
The interest rate spread measuring the risk of a banking crisis is insignificant for the 
Malaysia regressions but significant for specifications I and III for Argentina. Thus, we find 
weak evidence for the hypothesis that ADR investors take the risk of a joint currency and 
banking crisis into account when modifying their depreciation expectations.  
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 For a discussion of competitive devaluations in Southeast Asia see, among others, Corsetti et al. (2000) and 
Chinn (2006).  
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 For Venezuela (1994-1996) we can only interpret the coefficient of the “raw” interest rate spread measuring 
the combined risk of a currency crisis and a banking crisis as discussed above. 
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For Venezuela (1994-1996), we find a significantly positive coefficient for the “raw” 
interest rate spread measuring the combined currency and banking crisis expectations. A 1% 
increase in the raw interest rate spread yields a 0.4% increase in the ADR spread. Thus, we 
find robust evidence that a higher crisis risk assessment in the Venezuelan money market 
spills over to ADR investors’ perceptions of currency crisis risk.      
The variables controlling for investor sentiment largely confirm the findings of 
Arquette et al. (2008). The relative company P/E ratio is significantly positive in the 
regressions for Argentina and Malaysia. Moreover, we find significant evidence of a positive 
correlation between the relative market DY ratio and the ADR spread. Apparently, there is a 
kind of pro-cyclical behavior among ADR investors where better investor sentiment towards 
local stocks lead to higher local stock prices and thus to higher ADR spreads. The market 
capitalization is largely insignificant, except for Venezuela (1994-1996) where we find a 
positive and significant coefficient. For the dividend per share we largely find insignificant 
results indicating that differences in tax regimes only play a minor role in our dataset. 
 
III.5.2 Regime switches in the determination of currency crisis expectations 
The estimation results of the panel models provide evidence that ADR investors’ depreciation 
expectations are determined by daily observable currency crisis risk drivers, which measure 
the sustainability of a peg regime. In this section, we determine whether there are regime 
switches in ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations-making process. If the peg is 
relatively safe, for example, because capital controls effectively shield the domestic currency 
from speculative pressure, depreciation expectations will be low and the ADR spread will 
respond to variation in the risk drivers only moderately. If the peg regime becomes 
vulnerable and ADR investor do not believe that the fixed rate regime will survive, 
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depreciation expectations – as measured by the ADR spread – will be significantly driven by 
crisis variables that inform the ADR investors about the sustainability of the peg. 
We apply the regime switching methodology of Bai et al. (1998), which allows us to 
determine the most significant date of the regime change, i.e., the day when the most 
significant change in the correlation between the ADR spread and the crisis risk drivers 
occurs, as well as the confidence interval at this break date. The methodology of Bai et al. 
(1998) has been applied, for example, by Kallberg et al. (2005) and Pasquariello (2008).
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The following presentation of the regime switching model is based on Kallberg et al. 
(2005). We estimate the following linear time series equation for each capital control episode, 
where the ADR spreads and the company-specific control variables are averaged: 













  .                    (III.11) 
The first part of Eq. (III.11) shows the determination of the average ADR spread, tY , in the 
first regime, where tY , is regressed on a constant,  , and a set of p  exogenous variables, 
ptx , including the risk drivers, the (averaged) control variables, and the lagged average ADR 
spread, with the corresponding coefficients of the first regime, pB . The second part of the 
equation shows the change in the coefficients in the second regime, where  kd t  is a dummy 
variable equal to one if t  is greater than or equal to the potential break date k  and otherwise 
equal to zero,   and pB  denote the change in the value of the constant and the 
coefficients in the second regime, respectively, and t  is the error term. In matrix form, Eq. 
(III.11) reads: 
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 Kallberg et al. (2005) study whether the Asian crisis 1997/98 induced a regime switch in the dependency of 
the currency and equity returns (or return volatilities). Pasquariello (2008) examines whether financial crises 
lead to structural breaks in the efficiency of ADR pricing. 
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  ttttt SSVkdVY   ,                          (III.12) 
where  pttt xxV ,...,,1 1 ,     B,...,B, p1 ,     B,...,B, p1 , and S  is a selection 
matrix with ones on the diagonal for parameters of the variables in tV   that are allowed to 
change, and zeros otherwise. Rewriting Eq. (III.12) yields: 
  ttt kZY   ,                             (III.13) 
with     SVkdVkZ tttt  ,  and   S, . In order to find the optimal date of the regime 
change, k , Eq. (III.13) is estimated for each possible value of k , i.e., for a time sample of 
T,..,t 1 , this implies 12  T,..,k . As Bai et al. (1998, p. 398) we consider the maximum 
of the Wald F-statistic outlined in Eq. (III.14), which tests the null that the second-regime 
coefficient changes of the variables allowed to break are jointly equal to zero, i.e. 0S : 
































  ,                  (III.14) 
where T  is the length of the time sample,  IR ,0  is such that  SR  , and  kˆ  and kˆ  
are the estimators for   and the error variance, 2 , respectively, for a given value of kˆ . The 
critical values for the test statistic  kFˆ  can be found in Bekaert et al. (2002, pp. 244-245). If 
the maximum of the F-statistic for a chosen kˆ  is significant at least at the 10% level, we 
conclude that a regime switch occurred on this day. The asymptotic confidence interval at 
this break date that covers at least  %1100   is given by Bai et al. (1998, p. 402):    
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where  2/1c  is the  th1100  quantile of the Picard (1985) distribution.   
We apply the Bai et al. (1998) methodology to search for the most significant regime 
switch in the determination of ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations. We estimate Eq. 
(III.13) for each possible break date, k , during a capital control episode.
75
 We allow the 
coefficients of the five
76
 potential crisis risk drivers – the commodity price index, the 
exchange rate index, the EMBI sovereign yield spread, and the interest rate spreads 
measuring currency and banking crisis risk, respectively – to change.77 The binary selection 
matrix, S , thus has five ones on the diagonal, which correspond to the matrix position of the 
five currency crisis risk drivers, and zeros otherwise. For each k , the estimators for the 
regression coefficients and the error variance are used to compute the Wald F-statistic as 
outlined in Eq. (III.14).  
Table III.4 shows the results for the dates of regime switches for the four episodes of 
capital controls. We report the median date of the regime switch, the maximum value of the 
Wald F-statistic, and the corresponding 5% confidence interval computed using Eq. (III.15). 
Table III.5 reports the estimation results of the regime switching regressions, on which the 
regime break dates reported are based (see Eq., III.13). 
As reported in Table III.4, we find significant regime switches for the capital control 
episodes of Argentina, Malaysia, and Venezuela (2003-2007). This means that the estimated 
changes in risk driver coefficients in the second regime are jointly different from zero at least 
at the 10% significance level. Thus, during these episodes of capital controls, ADR investors 
significantly altered the modus of determination of their currency crisis expectations. For 
Venezuela (1994-1996), we find no significant regime change. 
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 We only include stationary variables in the regressions. The results of the Augmented Dickey Fuller (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979) tests are reported in Table III.A5 in Appendix III.   
76
 Note that in the case of Venezuela (1994-1996) and Venezuela (2003-2007), the coefficients of only four 
crisis drivers are allowed to change as only data on a “raw” interest rate spread is available. 
77
 The coefficients of the control variables are not allowed to change as these variables should play no vital role 
in assessing the risk of currency crisis.  
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Note: This table reports the median structural break date kˆ  determined using the maximum Wald F-statistic 
(see Eq., III.14), which tests the null that the second-regime coefficient changes of the variables allowed to 
break are jointly equal to zero. The optimal break dates are determined using the coefficients of the regime 
switching regressions reported in Table III.5. We conclude that a break date is significant if the maximum of the 
F-statistic rejects the null at least at the 10% level. The critical values for the Wald F-statistic are taken from 
Bekaert et al. (2002, pp. 244-245): 14.030, 15.656, and 19.384 correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance 
level for Venezuela (1994-1996) and Venezuela (2003-2007) where four coefficients are allowed to break; 
16.564, 18.441, and 23.057 correspond to the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level for Argentina and Malaysia 






 denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. The 2.5
th
 and the 97.5
the 
percentiles around the break date are computed using Eq. (III.15).  
 
In the case of Argentina, we find evidence for a significant regime change on January 14, 
2002, shortly after the breakdown of the peg on January 11, 2002. Inspecting the pre-break 
coefficients and the post-break coefficient changes, we find that currency crisis expectations 
were driven by the EMBI sovereign yield spread and the interest rate spread measuring 
banking crisis risk before the regime switch. After the regime switch on January 14, 2002, 
ADR investors’ depreciation expectations no longer reacted to changes in these risk drivers 
as the sum of the pre-break coefficients and the post-break change in these coefficients 
virtually equals zero.  
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Table III.5: Results of the regime switching regressions 
Dependent variable: Δ 









Regime 1 coefficients     
Pre-break commodity price 









Pre-break exchange rate index 











Pre-break EMBI sovereign 














Pre-break interest rate spread 












Δ Raw interest 
rate spread  
0.058 
(0.69) 
Pre-break interest rate spread 








Regime 2 coefficient changes      
Post-break commodity price 









Post-break exchange rate 










Post-break EMBI sovereign 















Post-break interest rate spread 







Δ Raw interest 
rate spread  
-0.017 
(-0.06) 
Δ Raw interest 
rate spread  
-13.756 
(-0.64) 
Post-break interest rate spread 









R-squared 0.337 0.564 0.111 0.409 
p-value F-statistic 0.000
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
Durbin-Watson Statistic 2.028 2.465 2.002 2.036 
No. of observations 260 261 474 1111 
Note: This table reports the results of the regime switching regression as outlined in Eq. (III.13). The 
coefficients of the vulnerability measures are allowed to break. The table reports the pre-break (regime 1) 
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coefficients and the post-break (regime 2) coefficients. The variables are used in first differences (indicated by a 
Δ) in order to avoid the problem of unit roots. The regressions also include the averaged control variables, i.e. 
the Δ average relative company P/E ratio, the Δ average relative market P/E ratio, the Δ average relative 
company DY ratio, the Δ average relative market DY ratio, the Δ average log market capitalization, the average 
dividend per share, and the Δ average ADR spread lagged one day. The coefficients of the control variables are 
not reported but available upon request. The t-values in parentheses are computed using the heteroskedasticity 






 denotes 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level of significance, respectively. 
 
To explain this, one could argue that the Argentine exchange rate regime switched from a 
crisis mode with depreciation expectations exceeding 50% before the breakdown of the peg 
(see Section III.3) to a state of relative tranquility with steady depreciation but with much less 
volatility. For Malaysia, we find a significant regime switch on April 5, 1999 with a 
confidence interval of two weeks around the break. Analyzing the estimated coefficients, we 
find that depreciation expectations were driven mainly by the interest rate spread measuring 
banking crisis risk before the break. After the regime switch, the impact of the banking crisis-
related interest rate spread on ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations increased whereby 
the currency crisis-related interest rate spread also appear to be a significant driver of the 
ADR spread. This result suggests that ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations became 
increasingly dependent on market-based currency crisis risk drivers in the second regime.              
For Venezuela (2003-2007), we detect a significant regime switch on January 5, 2007.  
This regime switch was induced by a significantly higher correlation between the ADR 
spread and the EMBI sovereign yield spread after the regime switch. A possible explanation 
for this result may be that ADR investors were increasingly aware of the risk of a twin 






The ADR spread and the ADR shadow exchange rate seem to be promising early warning 
indicators of currency crises. If capital controls are introduced, the prices of ADRs and their 
underlying stocks can diverge. These ADR spreads reflect the ADR investors’ expectations 
of a devaluation. The price spread can be used to calculate the ADR shadow exchange rate, 
which represents the mean exchange rate ADR investors expect following a currency crisis or 
a realignment. As stock market data is used, currency crisis signals are generated on a daily 
basis and reflect ADR investors’ up-to-date assessment of the peg’s sustainability. This 
approach enables policymakers to identify currency crisis risk earlier and to take the 
necessary steps to realign an (unsustainable) peg rate before a crisis breaks out. In the capital 
control episodes analyzed, the ADR spread and the ADR shadow exchange rate fairly 
accurately identified the risk of a currency crisis and the need for realignment well before 
each crisis actually occurred, substantiating the rational expectations of ADR investors.  
Using panel regressions, we identify the risk drivers observable in daily frequency 
that feed ADR investors’ currency crisis expectations. We find that the ADR spread is driven 
by falling export commodity prices, depreciating currencies of trading partners, rising 
sovereign yield spreads, and rising interest rate spreads. Our high-frequency framework thus 
provides evidence that ADR investors use the academic knowledge about the occurrence of 
currency crises in their assessment of the peg’s sustainability. We also test for regime 
changes in the process of determining currency crisis expectations. We find evidence of a 
regime switch during the capital control episodes in Argentina (2001-2002), Malaysia (1998-
1999), and Venezuela (2003-2007). Thus, the impact of market-based crisis risk drivers on 
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III. Appendix 
Table III.A1: List of included ADR/underlying stock pairs  
Country Included ADR/underlying stock pairs 
Argentina (2001-2002) BBVA Banco Frances, Cresud S.A.C.I.F., Grupo Financiero Galicia, 
Metrogas, Petrobras Energia Participacoes, Telecom Argentina, 
Telefonica de Argentina, Transportadora de Gas del Sur, YPF 
Malaysia (1998-1999) Bandar Raya Developments, Silverstone Corporation, Sime Darby 
Venezuela (1994-1996) Corimon C.A. S.A.a, Mantex Common Sharesb, Sivensa Common Sharesb, 
Sudamtex de Venezuela ‘B’b 
Venezuela (2003-2007) Compañía Anónima Nacional de Teléfonos de Venezuela (CANTV) 
Information on ADRs is taken from the internet databases of JP Morgan (www.adr.com) and Bank of America 
(www.adrbny.com); 
a
Included from June 28, 1994 to December 18, 1995. 
b
Included from December 18, 1995 to 





Table III.A2: Index weights for the commodity price indices 
Country Index weights for the country-specific commodity price indices  
Argentina (2001-2002)
a 
Cereals (19.6%), Soya oil (19.6%), Crude oil (18.9%), Industrial 
metals (11.6%), Gas/fuel (11.4%), Soya beans/seeds (11.2%), 
Natural gas (4.9%), Copper (2.8%) 
Malaysia (1998-1999)
b 












The total value of exported commodities in 2001 was 12,497 million U.S. dollars which equals 47.1% of 
total exports; Source: INDEC (National Institute of Statistics and Census), Argentine Ministry of Economy; 
b
The total value of exported commodities in 1998 was 8,699 million U.S. dollars which equals 12.1% of total 
exports; Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/85; 
c
The total value of exported commodities in 1994 was 
13,432million U.S. dollars which equals 83.5% of total exports; Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/117; 
d
The total value of exported commodities in 2004 was 28,917 million U.S. dollars which equals 86% of total 
exports; Source: ECLAC (Economic Commision for Latin America and the Caribbean) Statistical Yearbook of 
















Table III.A3: Index weights for the export destinations’ exchange rate indices 
Country Index weights for the country-specific export destinations’ exchange 




Brazil (31.8%), Eurozone (20.5%), Chile (14.7%), China (5.8%), 
Paraguay (2.6%), Mexico (2.5%), India (2.2%), Iran (2.1%), Peru 
(2.0%), Korea (2.0%), Japan (1.8%), Egypt (1.8%), South Africa 
(1.6%), Thailand (1.5%), Malaysia (1.5%), Bolivia (1.4%), Denmark 




Singapore (25.8%), Japan (16.0%), Netherlands (7.1%), Hong Kong 
(7.1%), United Kingdom (5.5%), Thailand (4.8%), Germany (4.6%), 
China (4.1%), India (3.9%), Australia (3.5%), Korea (3.5%), Philippines 
(2.4%), Indonesia (2.1%), Belgium (1.8%), France (1.6%), Pakistan 




Colombia (23.7%), Suriname (14.7%), Brazil (9.5%), United Kingdom 
(7.2%), Germany (5.6%), Dominican Republic (5.3%), Japan (4.8%), 
Mexico (4.5%), Netherlands (4.1%), Canada (3.5%), Ecuador (2.6%), 
Italy (2.2%), Guatemala (2.0%), Chile (1.8%), Peru (1.7%), Spain 




Netherlands Antilles (47.4%), Eurozone (8.8%), Colombia (7.1%), 
Mexico (4.2%), Peru (3.8%), Dominican Republic (3.6%), United 
Kingdom (3.5%), Singapore (3.4%), Canada (2.7%), Nicaragua (2.6%), 
Ecuador (2.6%), Costa Rica (2.1%), China (1.9%), Japan (1.4%), El 
Salvador (1.1%), Brazil (1.1%), Trinidad and Tobago (0.9%), Chile 
(0.7%), Guatemala (0.6%), Jamaica (0.6%) 
Note: Source: IMF Directions of Trade Statistics (DOTS); aThe total value of exports to the 20 largest trading 
partners in 2001 was 19,451 million U.S. dollars which equals 87.3% of total exports; 
b
The total value of 
exports to the 20 largest trading partners in 1998 was 48,164 million U.S. dollars which equals 65.6% of total 
exports;
 a
The total value of exports to the 20 largest trading partners in 1994 was 6,032 million U.S. dollars 
which equals 35.3% of total exports
 a
The total value of exports to the 20 largest trading partners in 2004 was 
14,746 million U.S. dollars which equals 37.2% of total exports.  
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Table III.A4: Results of the panel unit root tests 
 Argentina Malaysia Venezuela (1994-1996) 









































































EMBI sovereign yield spread  
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Note: This table presents the panel unit root test statistics of Im et al. (2003) (the IPS average t-statistic) and of Maddala and Wu (1999) (the MW Chi2 distributed 







 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. For the order of the autoregressive correction, we use the Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC). 
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Table III.A5: Results of the time series unit root tests  
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Note: The Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) tests the null that the variable 







 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The critical values for the 
ADF test statistic are taken from McKinnon (1996). For the order of the autoregressive correction for the ADF  







What can currency crisis models tell us about the risk of withdrawal from 





I study whether American Depositary Receipt (ADR) investors perceive the risk that 
vulnerable member countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, or Spain, could leave 
the eurozone in order to address financial problems associated with the subprime crisis using 
national monetary policy. Employing daily data, I analyze the impact of vulnerability 
measures related to currency crisis theories on ADR returns. I find that ADR returns fall 
when: sovereign bond yield spreads or sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spreads rise (i.e., 
sovereign debt crisis risk increases); domestic banks’ CDS premiums rise or stock returns fall 
(i.e., banking crisis risk increases); or, the euro’s overvaluation increases (i.e., the risk of 
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 This paper is based on: Eichler, S., 2011. What can currency crisis models tell us about the risk of withdrawal 
from the EMU? Evidence from ADR data. Journal of Common Market Studies 49, 719-40. Used with 




Twelve years after its inception, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is facing its most 
difficult challenge. The subprime lending crisis, triggered by significant reductions in 
leverage and prices in the U.S. housing market (Geanakoplos, 2010) and intensified by global 
macroeconomic imbalances and lacking policy coordination (Pauly, 2009), insufficient 
banking regulation (Karmann, 2008), fast credit expansion driven by lax monetary policy 
(Carmassi et al., 2009), and bad investment policies particularly of state-owned banks (Hau 
and Thum, 2009), has brought many banks in the EMU to the verge of bankruptcy. High 
public debt levels (produced by chronic overspending, severe recessions, and national bank 
bailout plans) feed speculations about possible sovereign debt defaults in the most vulnerable 
EMU member countries – Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. What is more, the 
export industry in several member countries is suffering under the strong euro whose 
exchange rate still stands near a record high against the U.S. dollar and many other major 
currencies.  
If the central banks of the EMU member countries above were not subordinate to the 
European Central Bank (ECB), they could ease their monetary policies at national discretion. 
In that case, a national central bank would have several options: to increase the liquidity 
supply in order to prevent bank failures; to purchase national sovereign bonds to reduce the 
lending costs of the government or increase inflation in order to reduce the real value of 
sovereign debt; or to devalue the new national currency in order to support the domestic 
export industry. The existence of a single currency for all EMU member countries, however, 
reduces the ability of these countries to cope with financial difficulties in this (cheap) way 
through monetary policy. Although the ECB has implemented measures meant to support the 
banking sectors and governments in the EMU, autonomous national central banks of the 
vulnerable member countries would probably pursue more expansionary monetary policies. 
As the economic centrifugal forces in the EMU are growing larger each day, it is no longer a 
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purely hypothetical question as to whether a member country would consider leaving the 
EMU. As the crisis of the European Monetary System in 1992/93 illustrates, opportunistic 
governments may rationally decide to reassert national authority over monetary policy if the 
benefits of dropping out of exceed the benefits of remaining in a fixed-exchange rate regime 
(Obstfeld, 1994, 1996).  
 I use data on American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) to study whether financial markets 
perceive the risk that vulnerable member countries could leave the EMU. ADRs are 
appropriate in this context since the ADR market provides information about exchange rate 
expectations. An ADR represents the ownership of a specific number of underlying shares in 
the home market on which the ADR is written.
79
 While the ADR is traded at a U.S. stock 
exchange and is denominated in U.S. dollars, the underlying European stock is denominated 
in euros and traded at a stock exchange of the home market in the EMU. Since the ADR and 
its corresponding underlying stock produce identical cash flows and incorporate equivalent 
rights and dividend claims, the returns of both types of a company’s stocks should be equal in 
exchange rate-adjusted terms.  
An important finding in the literature is that currency crises can have a significant 
impact on the pricing of ADRs. Many studies conclude that the returns on U.S. dollar-
denominated ADRs are negatively affected by currency crises as the devaluation of the local 
currency depresses the dollar value of the underlying stock (Bailey et al., 2000; Kim et al., 
2000; Bin et al., 2004). Pasquariello (2008) finds that the outbreak of a financial crisis 
typically leads to a disintegration of the local capital market measured by a persistent 
violation of the law of one price between an ADR and its underlying stock.
80
 Arquette et al. 
(2008) analyze the price spreads between Chinese underlying stocks and their ADRs (or H-
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 See Karolyi (1998) for an excellent survey on the ADR market. 
80
 Another branch of the literature studies how the introduction of capital controls affects ADR pricing (Melvin, 
2003; Levy Yeyati et al., 2004; Auguste et al., 2006). These authors find that controls on capital outflows in 
Argentina 2001/02 led to a premium of the underlying stock price over the ADR price. Using a panel of 
emerging economies, Levy Yeyati et al. (2009) confirm this result, finding that controls on capital outflows 
(inflows) lead to persistent price premiums (discounts) of the underlying stock over the ADR. 
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shares) and find that exchange rate expectations – extracted from forward exchange rates – 
explain 40% of the variation in the price deviation. The results of the existing literature 
indicate that currency crises may influence the relative pricing of ADRs and their underlying 
stocks and that the price spread is correlated with market-traded forward exchange rates.  
 I contribute to the literature by analyzing whether ADR investors perceive the risk that 
vulnerable member countries could leave the EMU. Although there are many advantages to 
membership in the EMU, currency unions restrict national monetary policy (De Grauwe, 
2007). Of course, conducting a rule-based monetary policy to fight inflation was the main 
purpose for creating the EMU (Schelkle, 2005; Segers and Van Esch, 2007). In the light of the 
subprime lending crisis, however, the EMU impedes the ability of national 
governments/central banks to cope with financial vulnerabilities. Although the introduction of 
the euro and membership in the EMU are generally considered to be irrevocable, many 
authors agree that sovereign states can choose to withdraw from the EMU (Cohen, 1993; 
Scott, 1998; Buiter, 1999; Eichengreen, 2007). Moreover, the new Treaty of Lisbon includes 
an explicit provision regulating a negotiated withdrawal. Thus, governments of sovereign 
states may rationally decide to withdraw from the EMU if the benefits of leaving exceed the 
benefits of remaining in the EMU. 
 If Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, or Spain were to leave the EMU and introduce new 
national currencies, these currencies would most likely depreciate against the U.S. dollar (and 
the euro) as the national governments eased their national monetary policies. From the 
literature on currency crises, I hypothesize three factors that determine the vulnerability to the 
outbreak of such a politically induced currency crisis. First, governments may choose to leave 
the EMU in order to address a domestic banking crisis. If domestic banks are bailed out by 
providing them with large amounts of the new national currency, inflation rates will increase 
which may, according to the relative purchasing power parity, lead to a depreciation of the 
new national currency. Second, governments may leave the EMU in order to solve a 
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sovereign debt crisis. The new national central bank may be pushed to purchase every amount 
of domestic sovereign bonds in order to guarantee the funding of public deficits. Moreover, 
higher inflation rates produced by monetary easing may reduce the real sovereign debt 
burden. Higher inflation rates may, in turn, lead to a depreciation of the national currency. 
Third, member countries may want to leave the EMU in order to pursue competitive 
devaluations. By devaluating the national currency – an option which does not exist for EMU 
member countries – the government can support the domestic export industry. 
 Withdrawal from the EMU is a political decision. Although this analysis cannot explain 
the actual choice of policymakers to withdraw from or remain in the EMU, I can evaluate 
whether ADR investors – who are exposed to capital losses in the case of withdrawal – 
perceive a risk of withdrawal from the EMU and the vulnerability factors that drive such a 
risk. I apply a multifactor pricing model which assumes that systematic risk factors are priced 
in ADR returns. If ADR investors perceive the risk of withdrawal from the EMU cum 
devaluation in the future, they will take this exchange rate risk into account and (ex ante) 
attach a premium to that country’s U.S. dollar-denominated ADR returns. This exchange rate 
risk premium accounts for the risk that the new national currency – in which the original stock 
would be denominated – may depreciate against the U.S. dollar as a result of leaving the 
EMU. I hypothesize that the exchange rate risk premium is driven by three vulnerability 
factors that influence a government’s decision to leave/remain in the EMU: 1) the possibility 
of a twin currency and banking crisis; 2) the possibility of a twin currency and sovereign debt 
crisis; 3) the incentive to devalue a new national currency competitively. The goal of the 
paper is to evaluate whether the exchange rate risk premium (priced in ADR returns) is 
significantly correlated with empirical measures of the hypothesized vulnerability factors.
81
 A 
significant correlation between the vulnerability measure and ADR returns would suggest that 
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 For a similar methodological approach to analyze the determinants of exchange rate risk premiums priced in 
stock returns, see Bailey and Chung (1995).  
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ADR investors perceive the risk of withdrawal from the EMU and that this risk is driven by 
the vulnerability measure tested.  
 In order to test the hypotheses about the factors that determine the risk of withdrawal from 
the EMU as perceived by ADR investors, I regress the daily ADR returns on five empirical 
measures that capture the three types of financial vulnerabilities. I use daily data on 22 ADRs 
whose underlying stocks are traded in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, or Spain, in the period 
January 2007 to March 2009. The panel estimation results largely confirm that the 
vulnerability measures significantly influence ADR returns in the hypothesized direction, 
suggesting that the exchange rate risk premium is a composite measure of all vulnerability 
factors. Higher credit default swap (CDS) premiums and lower stock returns of domestic 
banks – which indicate higher risk of banking crisis – significantly reduce ADR returns. This 
finding suggests that ADR investors perceive the risk that member countries with a vulnerable 
banking system could leave the EMU in order to support their banks using national monetary 
policy measures. I also find evidence that higher sovereign CDS spreads and sovereign bond 
yield spreads – which indicate higher risk of sovereign debt crisis – significantly reduce ADR 
returns. This suggests that vulnerable EMU member countries may leave the EMU in order to 
address sovereign debt problems. An appreciation of the effective national euro exchange rate 
– which reflects a higher incentive for competitive devaluation – increases the risk of 
withdrawal, thereby significantly reducing ADR returns.            
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section IV.2 discusses the 
alternatives to, legal aspects of, and consequences of withdrawal from the EMU. Section IV.3 
presents the hypotheses on currency crisis risk drivers. Section IV.4 describes the data and 





IV.2 Alternatives to, legal aspects of, and consequences of leaving the EMU 
Although withdrawal from the EMU would entail several benefits (as explained in the 
introduction), several aspects of the EMU must be considered when assessing the risk of 
withdrawal. First, there are several ways how vulnerable EMU member countries can get 
financial support from within the EMU, which may reduce the incentive to withdraw from the  
monetary union. Second, the legal aspects of withdrawal from the EMU must be taken into 
account. Third, withdrawal entails several negative as well as positive consequences.    
 
IV.2.1 Alternatives to leaving the EMU 
There are several alternative ways to support vulnerable banking sectors, to service sovereign 
debt, or to reduce the overvaluation of the currency than by withdrawing from the EMU. The 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) may provide financial assistance to support 
troubled banks in the EMU member countries. Although the ECB cannot act as a lender of 
last resort on the national level, the Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEC) 
provides that the “ESCB shall contribute to the smooth conduct of policies pursued by the 
competent authorities relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and the 
stability of the financial system” (Art. 105(5) TEC). This means that the mandate of national 
banking supervision lies with national authorities, but the ECB/ESCB is responsible for 
guaranteeing financial stability at the EMU level. In the event of banking crisis in an EMU 
member country the statute of the ESCB allows the ECB to provide financial resources 
necessary to avert an EMU-wide banking crisis (ECB, 2005). Thus, the ECB’s “Enhanced 
Credit Support” program meant to support troubled banking systems in the EMU is well in 
line with the ECB’s mandate.82 
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 The “Enhanced Credit Support” program was implemented in October 2008 and comprises several non-
standard monetary policy measures. First, the ECB began to use a “fixed rate full allotment” tender for all 
refinancing operations, where the ECB provides eligible banks every amount of central bank liquidity they need 
at a fixed interest rate. Before this policy change, the ECB used a variable rate tender procedure where only the 
highest bids for central bank liquidity were considered. Second, the list of securities accepted by the ECB as 
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Member countries having trouble servicing their sovereign debt may also receive 
financial help from within the EMU. Although the no-bail-out rule (Art. 103 TEC) precludes 
the members of the Union from bailing out an EMU member, Article 100(2) of the TEC 
provides that a member state can get financial assistance from the other member countries if 
“severe difficulties” arise from “natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its 
control.” The subprime lending crisis may be classified as an exceptional occurrence since its 
impact on the economies of EMU member countries has been much more disastrous than 
recessions in the past. There are several ways to support a member country unable to service 
its sovereign debt. First, the ECB can buy sovereign bonds of the distressed EMU member 
country on the secondary market.
83
 This step is undertaken by the ECB since the 
implementation of its “Securities Markets Programme” in May 2010. The ECB’s purchases of 
vulnerable member countries’ sovereign bonds provides a steady demand for these bonds 
thereby producing lower bond yields.
84
 Recently, bailout packages financed by EMU member 
countries and the International Monetary Fund have been implemented to save the 
governments of Greece, Ireland and Portugal from bankruptcy. Sinn and Wollmershäuser 
(2011) point to a yet overlooked support measure within the eurosystem. They show that the 
Deutsche Bundesbank (in particular) grants TARGET II credits to the national central banks 
particularly of the vulnerable EMU member states Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain. These 
TARGET II credits are generated in order to finance the current account deficits of these 
vulnerable countries and may diminish in value in the case of a sovereign default of one of the 
debtor countries. Another possibility to support troubled governments would be to issue a 
                                                                                                                                                        
eligible collateral for refinancing operations was extended. The rating threshold for marketable and non-
marketable securities used as collateral was lowered from A- to BBB-. Third, the ECB offered longer-term 
refinancing operations with maturities of 3, 6 and 12 months. Fourth, the number of financial institutions eligible 
for fine-tuning operations was extended from 140 to 2,000. Fifth, the ECB supplied foreign exchange swaps to 
provide EMU banks with foreign currency, particularly U.S. dollars. 
83
 This circumvents the outright prohibition of direct lending by the ECB or national central banks to member 
states (Art. 101 TEC). 
84
 Although the ECB does not publish data on the country composition of these bond purchases, most observers 
believe that Greek, Portuguese and Irish sovereign bonds represent the vast majority of the ECB’ sovereign bond 
holdings (Belke, 2010). 
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common eurozone bond where all participating EMU member countries jointly guarantee the 
debt service of the bond. Such a common eurozone bond with a single interest rate suggests 
that the risk premiums of all issuing countries would be pooled, thereby decreasing the 




In order to cope with an overvalued euro, the ECB may intervene at the foreign 
exchange market to devalue the euro against the currencies of the EMU member countries’ 
major trading partners. Regulations on exchange rate policies of the ESCB, however, are 
relatively rigid. Art. 111 of the TEC assigns competence in the field of exchange rate policy 
to the European Council, which can authorize foreign exchange market interventions if “a 
qualified majority [in the Council is achieved and] on a recommendation from the ECB or 
from the Commission, and after consulting the ECB” and only if “the objective of price 
stability” is not at risk. EMU member countries are quite heterogeneous with respect to 
inflation rates, trade patterns and, thus, the extent of overvaluation of their national effective 
exchange rates. It therefore seems difficult to achieve a majority in the European Council as 
to whether the euro is overvalued and whether foreign exchange market interventions would 
lead to inflationary pressure or not. For an individual EMU member country facing an 
overvalued currency, it seems much easier to leave the EMU and realign a new national 
currency at an undervalued level than to organize an intervention in the foreign exchange 
market from within the EMU. 
  
IV.2.2 Legal aspects of leaving the EMU 
A country that enters the Third Stage of the EMU – in which the national currency is 
substituted for euros at an “irrevocably fixed rate” (Art. 123(4) TEC) – loses its sovereignty 
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 De Grauwe and Moesen (2009) propose an alternative arrangement for interest rates in which each 
participating country pays an individual market-determined interest rate on its part of the eurozone bond. This 
arrangement avoids the problem of high-interest-rate countries free riding on the low interest rates of countries 
with sound public finances.  
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over national monetary policy. This provision prevents the countries that join the EMU from 
leaving the Union too easily in order to ensure stability.
86
 However, many authors argue that 
sovereign member states can choose to leave the EMU (Cohen, 1993; Scott, 1998; Buiter, 
1999; Eichengreen, 2007). This view is based on the fact that while the Third Stage of the 
EMU achieves monetary union, it does not achieve political union. Monetary unions such as 
the EMU are based on a political consensus among sovereign states, but “so long as member 
states retain political independence, … one or another government might eventually choose to 
reassert its monetary autonomy” (Cohen, 1993).87  
The new Treaty of Lisbon includes a provision outlining voluntary withdrawal which 
may cause the member countries to re-think the pros and cons of remaining in the eurozone.
88
 
This new provision makes it clear that membership in the EMU is not irreversible but rather 
an ongoing freely-made choice. Art. 50(2) of the Treaty of Lisbon allows a member country 
to withdraw from the EMU after notifying the European Council of its intention, negotiating 
with the other member countries, and concluding the negotiations with a qualified majority of 
the European Council and with the consent of the European Parliament. Art. 50(2) of the 
Treaty of Lisbon provides that a withdrawal agreement shall specify the member’s “future 
relationship with the Union.” This means that a country may secede from the EMU and still 
remain a member of the EU (Dougan, 2008). Art. 50(3) of the Treaty of Lisbon provides for 
automatic withdrawal if a withdrawal agreement between the withdrawing member and the 
other members fails: the “Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question” two years after 
the Council is notified of the state’s intention to withdraw and unless the period is extended. 
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 For an excellent overview of the importance of commitment mechanisms for the credibility of the EMU, see 
Schelkle (2006).  
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 Polling data of the Eurobarometer suggests that a withdrawal from the EMU would be democratically 
legitimated in several vulnerable member countries. More than 50 percent of the March 2009 polling 
respondents in Italy, Portugal, and Spain, for example, believed that using national monetary policy would be 
more effective in resolving the consequences of the subprime lending crisis than the monetary policy conducted 
by the ECB (Jones, 2009).  
88
 See Art. 50(1) of the Treaty of Lisbon.  
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IV.2.3 Consequences of leaving the EMU 
Withdrawal entails several negative as well as positive consequences. In addition to the 
advantages of an autonomous national monetary policy mentioned in the introduction, a 
withdrawing member may benefit from reclaiming (national) assets from the ECB. The 
withdrawing state can seek the return of its share of the ECB’s capital and foreign exchange 
reserves that had been transferred to the ECB when it was established (see Art. 28-30 of the 
ESCB Statute).  
Leaving the EMU would involve several transaction and political costs as well as 
contractual uncertainties negatively affecting the withdrawing country. For example, some 
transaction costs include the reprogramming of ATM and vending machine computer codes, 
the physical delivery of the new currency, costs associated with the re-denomination of 
wages, capital income, taxes, deposits, loans, and mortgages, and the conversion of prices 
quoted on the national stock exchanges. On the political side, withdrawal from the EMU 
could result in a loss of political power in the EU. This could involve diplomatic tensions with 
the remaining EMU members, or the former EMU-member could be relegated to second-tier 
status in negotiations over EU issues. Withdrawal could also damage the European integration 
process since the “EMU is foremost a major step on the road to ‘ever closer union’ in Europe” 
(Buiter, 1999). Finally, withdrawal could damage the EMU’s credibility negatively affecting 
the conduct of the ECB’s monetary policy.  
There are also legal uncertainties involved in an EMU withdrawal. First, if a country 
withdraws from the EMU so that fiscal deficits can be easily monetized by the national central 
bank the incentive for excessive public spending will be increased. A likely outcome would 
be that that the considered country will not meet the Maastricht criteria on fiscal deficits and 
public debt (any more). In this case, the country could be fined for breaching the Stability and 
Growth Pact if it does not comply with Council recommendations to address fiscal deficits 
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and/or high public debt. Second, it is not clear whether existing euro-denominated contractual 
obligations would remain in euros or be re-denominated in the new national currency. In 
general, the principle of lex monetae says that the debtor is obligated to re-pay the debt, which 
is expressed in the currency of the debtor’s country at issuance, in the currency that is the 
legal tender of the debtor’s country at the time of payment. According to Scott (1998), it is not 
clear whether lex monetae applies if the issuer’s country, for example Greece, withdraws from 
the EMU. On the one hand, Greek law may apply, suggesting a re-denomination of debt from 
euros to the new national currency. On the other hand, EU law – with the euro (the issuing 
currency) as the legal tender of the EMU – may apply, suggesting no re-denomination. Scott 
(1998) concludes that the principle of lex monetae cannot be applied to withdrawal from the 
EMU and that the courts would apply the law specified in the contract. For most government 
bonds, this would be the national law of the withdrawing country, suggesting re-denomination 
of sovereign debt into the new national currency. In this case, withdrawal from the EMU 
becomes an attractive option for highly-indebted EMU members. For contracts that specificy 
foreign or EU law, the legality of re-denomination is uncertain given the lack of precedence 
for court cases involving withdrawal from an ongoing monetary union.    
 
IV.3 Indicators of currency crisis risk  
The political choice to withdraw from the EMU involves costs and benefits. While the 
transaction, political, and legal costs are assumed to be relatively stable over time, the benefits 
are functions of the time-variant severity of a banking or sovereign debt crisis and of the 
degree of overvaluation. Thus, assessing whether financial markets perceive the risk of 
withdrawal from the EMU requires finding proxies for the financial vulnerabilities driving the 
decision to leave the EMU.   
The following derives from the literature three hypotheses about the dependency 
between the risk of a currency crisis (i.e. the risk of withdrawal from the EMU cum 
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devaluation) and vulnerabilities stemming from the risk of a banking crisis, the risk of a debt 
crisis, and the incentive for competitive devaluations. I argue that if ADR investors take these 
vulnerabilities into account when evaluating the risk that some countries could leave the 
EMU, ADR returns should be affected by empirical measures capturing these vulnerabilities. 
In each of the following three sub-sections I first derive the theoretical hypothesis from the 
literature and then explain how I measure the vulnerability factors empirically by using daily 
observable market-based measures.  
  
IV.3.1 Twin banking and currency crises 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) present empirical evidence that banking and currency crises 
often occur together. A banking crisis may force the central bank, acting as a lender of last 
resort, to bail out troubled banks by printing money which, in turn, produces inflationary 
pressure that can lead to a currency crisis (Diaz-Alejandro, 1985; Velasco, 1987; Calvo, 1998; 
Miller, 2000). Accordingly, a higher risk of banking crisis should lead to higher currency 
crisis risk perceived by ADR investors, and thus, to falling ADR returns.  
In order to measure the risk of a banking crisis, I employ data on CDS premiums on 
domestic banks’ liabilities and the returns of domestic bank stocks. A CDS represents a 
financial instrument to hedge against the risk that a bank will default on its debt. Rising CDS 
premiums thus indicate a higher bank default risk. As I aim to measure the risk of a country-
wide banking crisis, I calculate the asset-weighted average of CDS basis points for all 
domestic banks Credit Market Analysis provides data for. I use CDS with maturities of five 
years.
89
 Table IV.A1 in Appendix IV lists the domestic banks included in the calculation of 
the average CDS premium index of each country.  
Another possibility to approximate the risk of a banking crisis is to use the 
development of the value of equity of domestic banks. According to Merton (1974), the 
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 Testing CDSs with maturities of one year and three years did not significantly affect the results.  
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equity of a firm can be interpreted as a call option that enables the shareholders to buy the 
firm (the underlying asset) by repaying the firm’s debt (the strike price). For a given value of 
debt and asset volatility, a lower (higher) value of equity indicates that shareholders anticipate 
a higher (lower) probability of default, ceteris paribus. To measure the value of equity of 
domestic banks, I employ data on the national banking stock sub-index of the Dow Jones 
Total Market Index for each country.  
If ADR investors perceive the risk that governments may leave the EMU in order to 
address a domestic banking crisis using national monetary policy, I expect higher CDS 
premiums and lower stock returns of domestic banks – which indicate a higher banking crisis 
risk – to lead to lower ADR returns.  
  
IV.3.2 Twin sovereign debt and currency crises 
Several empirical studies find that sovereign debt and currency crises often occur together 
(Reinhart, 2002; Dreher et al., 2006; Herz and Tong, 2008). In order to capture the 
dependency of both types of crises, many theoretical approaches apply a second-generation 
currency crisis framework, which assumes that the government weights the benefits and costs 
of defaulting on sovereign debt against the benefits and costs of giving up an exchange rate 
peg (Bauer et al., 2003; Benigno and Missale, 2004). A general finding is that a twin 
sovereign debt and currency crisis is more probable if a country’s government is highly-
indebted. As both types of crises are interrelated, a higher sovereign debt crisis risk should 
increase the currency crisis risk perceived by ADR investors and thus lead to lower ADR 
returns. 
 I employ two variables that measure sovereign debt crisis risk: sovereign bond yield 
spreads and sovereign CDS spreads. Sovereign bond yield spreads are calculated as the 
difference between the redemption yield on domestic sovereign bonds and the redemption 
yield on German sovereign bonds. Sovereign CDS spreads are calculated as the difference 
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between the domestic sovereign CDS premium and the German sovereign CDS premium. I 
use data on sovereign bonds and CDS with a maturity of five years provided by Datastream.
90
  
 If ADR investors perceive the risk that governments may leave the EMU in order to 
address sovereign debt problems using national monetary policy, I expect higher sovereign 
bond yield spreads and higher sovereign CDS spreads – which indicate higher sovereign debt 
crisis risk – to lead to lower ADR returns.     
 
IV.3.3 The incentive of competitive devaluations 
The incentive of competitive devaluations may serve as another determinant of currency crisis 
risk. Glick and Rose (1999) find that – as a result of beggar-thy-neighbour exchange rate 
policies – currency crises tend to spread regionally. An appreciation of the domestic currency 
against the currencies of a country’s export trading partners deteriorates the competitiveness 
of domestic exporters, which threatens domestic jobs. Opportunistic governments of countries 
with an overvalued currency have an incentive to leave the EMU and to devalue the new 
national currency in order to promote export growth. I therefore expect that an appreciation of 
a country’s effective euro exchange rate will increase the risk that the country will leave the 
EMU, thereby negatively affecting ADR returns.  
In order to measure the incentive of competitive devaluations, I compute a daily 
effective exchange rate (EER) index for each country. Of course, the same bilateral euro 
exchange rates apply for all EMU member countries. However, the effect of an appreciation 
of the euro against the pound sterling, for example, has a much more adverse effect on the 
Irish than on the Italian export industry. This is because exports to the United Kingdom make 
up about 33 percent of total exports for Ireland and only 11 percent of total Italian exports.
91
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 Testing sovereign bonds and sovereign CDS with maturities of one year and three years did not affect the 
results. 
91
 These numbers are based on the Directions of Trade Statistics database 2007 provided by the International 
Monetary Fund. 
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The EER index for each of the five countries, i , 51,..,i  , represents the effective value 
of the euro against the currencies of country i ’s 115
92
 trading partners by weighting the daily 
percentage changes of the bilateral euro exchange rates by the amount of bilateral exports.  
The EER index is constructed as a chain-linked index for country i  on day t , itEER : 
       ititi Tti Ttit II...IIEER   1111 11 ,                       (IV.1) 
where the percentage change of country i ’s EER index from day 1t  to day t  is given by  
i
tI . I calculate 
i























wI ,                               (IV.2) 
where t,je  is the bilateral euro exchange rate – measured as the amount of currency units of i
’s export trading partner j , 1151,...,j  , per euro – and 
i
jw  represents the share of i ’s exports 
to j  relative to i ’s total exports to the 115 countries in 2007. Data on bilateral euro exchange 
rates is taken from Datastream. Data on bilateral exports in 2007 is provided by the 
International Monetary Fund’s Directions of Trade Statistics database. The EER index is used 
in natural logs. Rising values of the EER index indicate an effective appreciation of the euro 
against the currencies of the domestic economy’s export trading partners and, thus, a 
deterioration of the competitiveness of domestic exporters.  
If ADR investors perceive the risk that governments may leave the EMU in order to 
devaluate the new national currency competitively, I expect that a higher EER index – which 
indicates a higher degree of currency overvaluation – will lead to higher risk of withdrawal 
expected by ADR investors and, thus, to falling ADR returns.     
                                                 
92
 Of course, the EMU countries cannot be considered here. Some small countries are not included due to lack of 
data on bilateral exports.   
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IV.4 Empirical analysis 
In order to test the hypotheses about the factors that determine the risk of withdrawal from the 
EMU as perceived by ADR investors, I regress the daily ADR returns on daily observable 
market-based measures that capture the vulnerabilities as outlined in Section IV.3. I consider 
22 ADR/underlying stock pairs from the vulnerable EMU member countries – Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain – from January 4, 2007 to March 16, 2009. Table IV.A2 in 
Appendix IV lists the companies included. All data is taken from Datastream.  
I use four control variables in the regressions. In order to control for investor 
sentiments, I use two measures proposed by Arquette et al. (2008). Investor preference for the 
European stock market over the U.S. stock market is measured by the relative market 
price/cash flow (P/CF) ratio. The relative market P/CF ratio is calculated by dividing the P/CF 
ratio of the respective European stock market by the P/CF ratio of the U.S. stock market.
93
 
Investor sentiment towards an individual company is measured by the relative company P/CF 
ratio. This is calculated by dividing the European stock’s P/CF ratio by the P/CF ratio of the 
European stock market as a whole.  
In each specification, I control for the returns of the underlying EMU stocks and the 
U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate (defined as the number of U.S. dollars one must pay for one 
euro). Both controls, by default, determine the ADR returns as ADRs are derivative securities 
that depend on the value of its underlying stock and on the U.S. dollar value of the currency 
the underlying stock is denominated in. Table IV.A3 in Appendix IV reports the summary 
statistics for the variables.  





ktkit xxreturn ADR    ,                        (IV.3) 
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 Data on the P/CF ratio of each stock market is taken from the Datastream Global Equity Index of each country 
provided by Datastream. 
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where the ADR return of company i on day t is regressed on a constant  , on k  variables 
which do not vary across companies of a country, ktx , i.e., the banking and sovereign debt 
crisis risk variables, the effective exchange rate index, the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate 
return, and the relative market P/CF ratio, and on j  company-specific variables, jitx , i.e., the 
returns of the local stocks and the relative company P/CF ratio. k  and j  are the 
coefficients; i  is the company-specific fixed effect; it  is the error.  
  Before estimating the panel regression models, I test for unit roots in the variables using 
the panel unit root tests of Im et al. (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999).
94
 Under the null of 
each test statistic, the time series contains a unit root. The results of the panel unit root tests 
can be found in Table IV.A4 in Appendix IV. In the regressions, I include a variable in levels 
only if the null of a unit root is rejected by both tests, at least at the ten percent level of 
significance. Variables for which the null of a unit root cannot be rejected are used in first 
differences in the estimations as indicated by a Δ in the results table. I consequently use the 
CDS premiums of domestic banks, the sovereign CDS spreads, the sovereign yield spreads, 
the effective exchange rate index, and the investor sentiment variables in first differences.     
In order to test the hypotheses, I estimate eight specifications. In each specification, I 
include the effective exchange rate index, the returns of the underlying stock, and the U.S. 
dollar/euro exchange rate returns. In each specification, I use one of the two vulnerability 
measures for banking crisis risk and sovereign debt crisis risk, respectively. The four possible 
combinations of financial crisis risk variables are tested in specifications I to IV. While 
specifications Ia to IVa do not include investor sentiment variables, specifications Ib to IVb 
do. In each specification, I include company dummies to control for fixed company-specific 
effects in the determination of ADR returns.
95
 The t-values are computed using robust 
                                                 
94
 Chapter V provides a short overview of (panel) unit root tests.    
95
 I used the Hausman (1978) specification test to determine whether or not a random effects model would be 
more appropriate than the applied fixed effects model. The results of the Hausman test indicate that the null 
 IV.19 
standard errors clustered by company to control for possible heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation in the residuals for a company across time.  
Table IV.1 displays the results of the panel estimations. Overall, the results indicate 
that the ADR returns significantly respond to changes in the vulnerability measures in the 
hypothesized direction. This suggests that ADR investors attach an exchange rate risk 
premium to ADR returns to account for the risk that ADR prices will plunge should an EMU 
member country introduce a new devalued national currency. Thus, the risk of a currency 
crisis, as perceived by ADR investors, rises with increases in the risk of a banking crisis, the 
risk of a sovereign debt crisis, or the incentive to devalue competitively. This suggests that 
ADR investors perceive the risk that vulnerable member countries might leave the EMU in 
order to address these financial problems using national monetary policy. 
I find robust evidence that higher CDS premiums of domestic banks, which indicate a 
higher banking crisis risk, significantly reduce ADR returns. I also find weak statistical 
evidence that lower bank stock returns, which indicate a higher default risk of domestic 
banks, are associated with falling ADR returns. Thus, ADR investors perceive the risk that 
governments of vulnerable member countries could leave the EMU in order to bail out 
domestic banks by using national monetary policy. Seemingly, ADR investors expect that 
such a withdrawal from the EMU would be associated with inflationary pressure and a 
depreciation of the new national currency. 
                                                                                                                                                        
hypothesis of no difference between the fixed and random effects coefficients is significantly rejected, indicating 
that the fixed effects model is more appropriate. 
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Table IV.1: Regression results 
Dependent variable: ADR returns Ia IIa IIIa IVa Ib IIb IIIb IVb 
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Relative company price/cash flow ratio (Δ) 
 



















































R-squared 0.450 0.455 0.448 0.451 0.451 0.456 0.449 0.452 
p-value F-statistic 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
No. of observations 9475 9475 9475 9475 9475 9475 9475 9475 
Note: This table presents the results of the panel regressions (see Eq., IV.3) for the period January 4, 2007 to March 16, 2009. t-values in parentheses based on robust standard 






 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Company fixed effects are included in each specification. 
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I find robust evidence that higher sovereign bond yield and CDS spreads, which 
indicate higher sovereign debt crisis risk, significantly reduce ADR returns. This result 
suggests that ADR investors perceive the risk that vulnerable member countries could leave 
the EMU in order to let the national central bank act as a lender of last resort for the highly 
indebted government by purchasing domestic sovereign bonds or by reducing the real value of 
public debt via the inflation tax.  
The regressions results also support the competitive devaluations hypothesis. An 
appreciation of the euro – as indicated by a rising national effective exchange rate – 
significantly reduces ADR returns. This result indicates that ADR investors perceive the risk 
that higher overvaluation of the euro against the currencies of a country’s export trading 
partners increases the incentive for the government to leave the EMU and devalue the 
domestic currency competitively in order to support the domestic export industry. 
In order to assess the relative importance of the vulnerability measures for explaining 
the exchange rate risk premium priced in ADR returns, I relate the estimated coefficients to a 
one standard deviation-change in each respective variable. The coefficient for stock returns of 
domestic banks, for example, ranges from 0.032 to 0.037 depending on the specification on 
which the significant coefficient is based. A decrease in stock returns of domestic banks by 
one standard deviation – being 3.90% (see Table IV.A3) – reduces ADR returns by 0.12%, to 
0.14%. Accordingly, a one standard deviation increase in CDS premiums of domestic banks, 
or sovereign yield spreads, or sovereign CDS spreads, or in the effective exchange rate index 
translates to a decrease in ADR returns by 0.19% to 0.20%, by 0.08% to 0.09%, by 0.23% to 
0.25%, or by 0.42% to 0.50%, respectively. The standardized impact of the vulnerability 
measures on ADR returns is quite small as explained in the following. The standardized 
measures are based on a one standard deviation-change in the variables recorded during the 
relatively tranquil observation period. If a member country were to actually leave the EMU, 
its sovereign yield spread, for example, would most likely increase by much more than one 
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standard deviation, i.e. by more than 0.07%. Thus, the standardized impact of vulnerability 
measures on ADR returns cannot be used to estimate the potential capital losses of ADR 
investors resulting from an EMU withdrawal. Instead, it can be used to assess the relative 
importance of these vulnerability measures for explaining the ADR investors’ perceptions of 
the risk of withdrawal from the EMU.  
The effective exchange rate index (measuring the overvaluation of the euro at the 
national level) has the largest standardized impact on ADR returns. This suggests that ADR 
investors perceive a considerable misalignment of the euro exchange rate for some vulnerable 
member countries. Introduction of a new, devalued national currency in order to promote 
export growth appears to be the most significant argument in favor of withdrawing from the 
EMU. The impact of the banking and sovereign debt crisis risk variables on ADR returns is 
similar.
96
 ADR investors seem to believe that the risk of withdrawal is driven equally by 
possible banking and sovereign debt crises. This finding seems reasonable as a considerable 
part of (implicit) public debt creation of some vulnerable EMU member countries (such as 
Ireland) can be attributed to the financing of bank bailouts, thereby linking the rise in 
sovereign debt crisis risk with the severity of the banking crisis. An interesting finding is that 
the CDS-based vulnerability measures have a larger standardized impact on ADR returns than 
the non-CDS-based vulnerability measures, i.e., bank stock returns for banking crisis risk and 
sovereign bond yield spreads for sovereign debt crisis risk. ADR investors seem to prefer 
CDS-based measures to derive crisis expectations since the primary purpose of CDS is to 
hedge against the risk of bank or sovereign defaults. The alternative measures reflect default 
risk-related information less precisely, making them less effective in assessing the risk of 
withdrawal.         
With respect to the control variables, the results largely confirm the findings of 
previous papers. Higher returns of the local stock and the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate 
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 The CDS premiums of the banking and sovereign debt crisis measures have a similar standardized coefficient. 
The standardized impacts of bank stock returns and sovereign yield spreads are also similar. 
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significantly increase ADR returns. This suggests an efficient pricing of ADRs, whose price 
depends on the value of the underlying stock and the value of the currency in which the 
underlying stock is denominated. For the investor sentiment variables, I obtain mixed results. 
While the relative company P/CF ratio is insignificant for all specifications, the coefficient for 
the relative market P/CF ratio is significantly positive.   
 
IV.5 Conclusions 
I find that financial market indicators reflecting the risk of a banking crisis, the risk of a 
sovereign debt crisis, and the incentive for competitive devaluations significantly influence 
ADR returns in the hypothesized direction. This suggests that ADR investors perceive the risk 
that some of the vulnerable countries studied might leave the EMU. However, although I 
cannot derive explicit probabilities of withdrawal, the likelihood of such withdrawals is 
probably rather small since the current institutional framework and the alternative channels of 
financial assistance from within the monetary union deter most governments from exiting the 
EMU. Moreover, the transaction costs, contractual uncertainties, and loss of political prestige 
may offset the economic benefits of an EMU withdrawal. I believe, however, that an EMU 
withdrawal is not purely hypothetical and that ADR investors price the risk of withdrawal 
with good reason. Firstly, the new provision on withdrawal in the Treaty of Lisbon provides 
an easy way to leave the EMU. Reluctant members would not have to fear open-ended 
negotiations with the other EMU member countries that could result in an unfortunate 
consensus.
97
 Secondly, it remains an open question whether mutual assistance within the 
EMU (such as supranational bailout funds) would be applied if the banking sector or national 
budget of a large EMU member country, such as those of Spain or Italy, broke down since 
granting financial assistance could jeopardize the stability of the whole EMU. European 
solidarity has its limits. This suggests that withdrawal from the EMU could be beneficial for 
                                                 
97
 With the new provision, the Treaties cease to apply to the withdrawing member after two years if no decision 
is reached. 
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both the withdrawing country and the remaining members of the EMU. Thirdly, addressing 
financial problems using national monetary policy has the advantage that the government 
retains sovereignty over the national budget.  
 The findings of this paper can help policymakers judge the sustainability of the EMU as 
perceived by ADR investors. Higher correlations between ADR returns and vulnerability 
measures in the future suggest that ADR investors perceive a higher risk of withdrawal from 
the EMU. Thus, the ADR market can be used as an early warning system for the stability of 
the EMU. Pro-EMU governments in particular will be interested in preventing withdrawals 
from the EMU as their re-election could be jeopardized in the event of actual withdrawals. 
The standardized coefficients can also be instructive for assessing the relative importance of 
the different vulnerability factors. Monitoring the correlation between ADR returns and the 
vulnerability measures can help prevent withdrawals if policymakers are able to address 
financial vulnerabilities within the EMU. However, time will show how long policymakers in 
the EMU will continue with the implementation of even more anti-crisis measures. The recent 
rescue measures of the ECB’s “Securities Markets Programme”, for example, are relatively 
controversial as the ECB’s holdings of risky sovereign bonds may lead to less political and 
financial independence of the ECB. The decision to implement the “Securities Markets 
Programme” has revealed the conflicts of interest within the ECB’s Governing Council. In an 
interview with Le Monde, ECB President Trichet mentioned that the May 9, 2010 decision in 
the ECB Governing Council regarding the implementation of the “Securities Markets 
Programme” was made with “an overwhelming majority” as opposed to the usual “unanimous 
decision”.98 Later on, on February 11, 2011 Axel Weber, President of Deutsche Bundesbank, 
resigned, indicating that he was no longer willing to support the anti-crisis policies of the 
ECB. 
 
                                                 
98
 See http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2010/html/sp100531_1.en.html. 
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IV. Appendix      
Table IV.A1: Domestic banks included in the national CDS premiums indices  
Country Included domestic banks 
Greece EFG Eurobank Ergas
a
, National Bank of Greece
a
  
Ireland Allied Irish Banks, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland 
Italy Banca Italease, Banca Siena, Banca PPO Italiana, Banca PPO Di Milano, 
Unicredito Italiano,  
Portugal Banco Commercial Portugues, Banco Espirito Santo 
Spain Banco Intl. Finance, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Banco Popular 
Espaniol, Banco Sabadell, Banco Santander, La Caja de Ahorros 
a



















Table IV.A2: List of included ADR/underlying stock pairs  
Country Included ADR/underlying stock pairs 
Greece Alpha Bank, Coca-Cola HBC, Hellenic Telecom, National Bank of 
Greece 




Italy Benetton Group, Eni, Fiat, Luxottica 
Portugal Energias de Portugal, Portugal Telecom 
Spain BBVA, Banco Santander, Endesa
b
, Repsol YPF, Telefonica 
Note: Information on ADRs is taken from the ADR website of The Bank of New York Mellon 
(www.adrbny.com); 
a
Data only available thru September 12, 2008 due to de-listing. 
b
Data only available thru 
























Table IV.A3: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ADR returns -0.143 3.580 -57.031 46.687 
CDS premiums of domestic banks 
(Δ) 
0.717 10.687 -250.433 98.733 
Stock returns of domestic banks -0.326 3.904 -29.107 29.789 
Sovereign yield spreads (Δ) 1.63E-03 0.067 -1.267 0.924 
Sovereign CDS spreads (Δ) 0.123 3.757 -28.000 52.000 
Effective exchange rate index (in 
logs) (Δ) 
0.022 0.410 -2.329 2.821 
Local stock returns -0.161 3.521 -60.799 39.204 
Exchange rate returns (USD/EUR) 0.012 0.690 -3.844 4.027 
Relative company price/cash flow 
ratio (Δ) 
-2.00E-03 0.180 -5.580 3.418 
Relative market price/cash flow 
ratio (Δ) 















Table IV.A4: Results of the panel unit root tests 














































































Note: This table presents the panel unit root test statistics of Im et al. (2003) (the IPS average t-statistic) and of 
Maddala and Wu (1999) (the MW Chi2 distributed average p-value) for the respective variable in levels and in 
first differences (in parentheses). Under the null of both test statistics the variable contains a unit root. Test 






 denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 








Overview of panel unit root tests 
 
A time series is defined as strictly stationary if the joint distribution of a process does not 
change in time (Maddala and Kim, 1998, p. 9). That is, the parameters characterizing the 
distribution of a process,          , do not change when the series is shifted by an arbitrary 
value τ,               for all         and τ. The most widely used concept of stationarity is 
weak or covariance stationarity (Maddala and Kim, 1998, p. 9). A process is said to be weakly 
or covariance stationary if its mean, variance, and autocovariance are constant, i.e. do not 
depend on time t: 
 (  )   (    )            ,                (V.1) 
   (  )     (    )   
          ,               (V.2) 
   (       )     (           )             
99
           (V.3) 
for all τ. Non-stationary or unit root processes have time-varying distribution parameters. In 
order to demonstrate the properties of stationary versus non-stationary processes, let us 
consider the processes    and   : 
            , | |   ,                  (V.4) 
           ,                      (V.5) 
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 Note that the covariance depends on the interval       for which the covariance is computed but not on the 
point in time t when it is computed. 
 V.2 
where the error terms    and    are white noise processes, i.e. they are assumed to be 
independently identically distributed with zero mean and constant variance,    (    
 ) and 
   (    
 ). The independence assumption implies that the errors are not correlated across 
time, i.e.  (      )    and  (      )    for    . 
Both    and    are autoregressive processes. The    process is called a random walk, 
which is a special case of the    process for    . While the random walk    is a 
nonstationary (or unit root) process with time-variant distribution parameters,     is stationary 
with asymptotically time-invariant distribution parameters as shown in the following. 
Both processes can be expressed in terms of past disturbances: 
    
    ∑ 
     
   
   
                                                                                                                     (   ) 
      ∑                                                                                                                                  (   )
   
   
 
For simplicity, it is assumed that the initial values of the processes are zero, i.e.      and 
    . 
The means of the processes are: 
 (  )   ,               (V.8) 
 (  )   .               (V.9) 
The variances of the processes are: 
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The means are time-invariant for both processes. However, the (asymptotic) behavior of the 
variances and autocovariances differs between both processes. While the variances and 
autocovariances are asymptotically constant for the stationary process   , they increase in 
time (t) for the non-stationary/unit root process   .  
The time dependence of non-stationary variables’ distribution parameters may lead to 
“spurious regressions” in empirical applications (Gujarati, 1995, p. 724). Based on Monte 
Carlo simulations Granger and Newbold (1974) present evidence that regressions using non-
stationary variables can produce spurious results. They find that even if the dependent and 
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 Note that the assumption of independently distributed error terms implies that  (      )    and 
 (      )    for    . 
 
 V.4 
independent variables in a regression are totally unrelated random walks, the t-statistic of the 
regression coefficient indicates a significant relationship for the majority of simulated cases. 
This empirical result was subsequently analyzed theoretically by Phillips (1986) who proves 
that for regressions involving non-stationary variables the t-statistic does not have a limiting 
distribution but diverges as the sample size grows.
101
 That is, the empirically measured t-
statistic rejects the null hypothesis of no relationship between the dependent and the 
independent non-stationary variable too often and, consequently, the critical values drawn 
from the theoretical distribution of the t-statistic cannot be applied. Entorf (1997) extends the 
study of Phillips (1986) to a panel setting showing that the divergent behavior of the empirical 
t-distribution also applies to panel data underlining the rationale to test for stationarity also in 
panel data sets in order to avoid the problem of spurious regressions.         
In order to detect whether a time series contains a unit root (i.e. whether it is non-
stationary) a number of unit root tests have been developed. The basic idea of unit root tests is 
to test the null hypothesis of     (i.e. the process contains a unit root/follows a random 
walk) against the one-sided alternative of stationarity    :102 
            ,     with         against       .                      (V.14) 
This test equation can be rewritten as: 
             ,     with        against                               (V.15) 
where            ,      .  
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 Further theoretical treatments of the problem of spurious regressions can be found in Durlauf and Phillips 
(1998), Marmol (1995) and Tsay and Chung (2000). 
102
 From a theoretical point of view, testing the null hypothesis of an explosive unit root process with     or a 
“countercyclical” unit root process with      would of course also be of interest. However, such types of unit 
root processes are very rare events in empirical applications and that is why they are not considered in the 
overwhelming majority of unit root tests (Wooldridge, 2006, p. 640).  
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One of the most popular and widely used unit root tests is the Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1979).
103
 The test equation of the ADF unit root test equation 
is:  
               ∑          
 
   
                                      (    ) 
The ADF unit root test controls for a possible constant  , time trend   , and autoregressive 
terms ∑        
 
    in the test equation.
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 The OLS estimate for  ̂ and its standard error 
se( ̂) can be used to test the null hypothesis of the presence of a unit root (      ) against 
the alternative of stationarity (      ) using the t-statistic  
   ̂   ( ̂). Dickey and 
Fuller (1979) show that    does not follow a conventional t-distribution but the so-called 
Dickey Fuller distribution, for which Dickey and Fuller (1979) compute critical values.
105
   
A number of tests have been developed in order to test for unit root in panel datasets 
with j=1,…,J cross section units observed over t=1,...,T periods.106 In this dissertation I use 
the panel unit roots tests of Im et al. (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999). Both tests are panel 
extensions of the time series ADF test. For both tests, the ADF test equation is estimated for 
each cross section unit j=1,…,J: 107 
                    ∑             
 
   
                                                                    (    ) 
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 Other popular unit root tests not considered here include, for example, the Phillips Perron test (Phillips and 
Perron, 1988) or the Kwiatkowski Phillips Schmidt Shin test (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). I focus on the ADF test 
since the panel unit root tests used in this dissertation are panel versions of the ADF test.   
104
 The optimal lag length N in the test equation may be determined using the Akaike or Schwartz information 
criteria.  
105
 Based on a larger set of simulations, MacKinnon (1996) tabulates the critical values of the Dickey Fuller t-
statistic for a larger set of sample sizes and assumptions concerning the test equation. 
106
 Entorf (1997), for example, shows that spurious regressions are also an issue for panel datasets underlining 
the rationale to test for unit roots also for panel data. 
107
 Similar to the standard ADF test discussed above, this test equation controls for a constant   , time trend    , 
and autoregressive terms  ∑          
 
   . 
 V.6 
A variable may contain a unit root for some cross section units, while for others it may not. 
Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses of both the Im et al. (2003) and the Maddala 
and Wu (1999) panel unit root tests can be written as:  
       ,     for all  , 
   {
                                         
                             
108                         (V.18) 
The panel unit root test of Im et al. (2003) relies on averaging the t-values of each cross 
section unit   
   ̂    ( ̂)  estimated from Eq. (V.17): 
   
 ̅̅̅̅  ∑  
 
 
   
 ⁄                                                                                                                                  (    ) 
Im et al. (2003) show that after appropriate standardizations the averaged ADF t-statistic    
 ̅̅̅̅  
has an asymptotic standard normal distribution.  
The Maddala and Wu (1999) test is based on combining the p-values of the ADF t-
statistics of each cross section. That is, based on the ADF test equation for each cross section 
unit (Eq., V.17) the ADF t-statistic,   
   ̂    ( ̂) , is computed. The p-value of the t-
statistic,   
 , is then transformed into    
 ̃  as outlined in Eq. (V.20):   
   
 ̃    ∑   (  
 )      
                                                                                                       (    )
 
   
 
Maddala and Wu (1999) show that    
 ̃  is distributed Chi-squared with 2J degrees of freedom.  
Under the null hypothesis of the Im et al. (2003) and the Maddala and Wu (1999) 
panel unit root tests the variable contains a unit in a panel context. A rejection of the null 
hypothesis suggests that the variable is stationary. In order to avoid the problem of spurious 
                                                 
108
 The j may be reordered if necessary. 
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regressions I use a variable in levels only if the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected by 
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